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RISKY BUSINESS:
VISUALIZING AND HISTORICIZING THE ROLE OF GEOGRAPHIC
REPRESENTATION AND THINKING IN AMERICAN BUSINESS
Geographic representation and thinking has a long history in the American business
world. This thesis examines the role of geographic representation and thinking in the fire
insurance industry in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries through the Sanborn
Map Company and in the development of site selection as a concept in the mid-twentieth
century through the biography of William Applebaum. Through these case studies, I
explore the relevance applied cartographic representations to the business world and the
opportunities it presents towards advancing geography as a discipline.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
In the midst of the chaos pulling at the very strings of our social, economic, and
political fabric, writing a thesis on the history of geographic thought and of historical
geography seems like the least relevant topic. Yet the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and
its impacts presents an opportunity for (or more likely, will force through budgetary
pressures) geography to reconsider its place within the academy and its overall objectives
as a discipline. However, even before the pandemic, geography was showing signs of
distress: the closure of weakened research-intensive departments at the University of
Southern California (2010) and Johns Hopkins University (2017) proceeded the
elimination of geography at teaching institutions such as Long Island University-Post
(Elizabeth, 2020). Threats to the departments at the University of Nebraska and the
University of Wisconsin-Stevens Points due to low enrollments pose ominous threats to
the future of the discipline (Dunker, 2018; Shastri and Hovorka, 2019). And while
writing this thesis, the University of Alaska decided to completely eliminate its entire
geography department (Whitford, 2020). Moreover, across the discipline, there has been
a significant decline in geography majors, with concern that the long-term effects on even
the most stalwart departments might bring about unwelcome changes that hurt geography
as we know it (Kaplan, 2019).
As the academy changes, so too must the discipline and the individuals who call
themselves geographers. Of course, this is not the first time the discipline has faced
existential crises: ever since geographers began meeting and building a body of
scholarship, there has been a debate over the state of the field, what geography’s unique
domain of knowledge is, and the discipline’s utility to society. This long, on-going
1

discussion over what geography “is” and what it can be has been both a liability and an
asset to the discipline. The same discipline that was “not a university subject” fit for
Harvard in 1948 is the same discipline that continues to thrive in recent decades (Smith,
1987). As a discipline, our ongoing concern about geography’s health has produced a
robust corpus of scholarship written by the eminent scholars who are responsible for the
current state and focus of the discipline. These reconceptualizations and rearticulations of
the discipline are the major and minor course corrections that have—for better or
worse—put geography where it is today. And while inherently each piece of scholarship
and every action taken by a geographer constitutes the advancement of a particular vision
of geography, some visions have found lasting influence and adherents in the discipline,
long out living the original individuals who first conceptualized them.
In this thesis, I probe at these alternative versions of the discipline, seeking to
uncover the stories of forgotten geographies and geographers whose impact on the
discipline and the American landscape continues to have major implications regarding
the business of geography. With bits of evidence scattered across dated journal articles
and archival collections, and other forms of evidence illuminated only through data
visualization, these stories reflect alternative histories of the discipline that are not part of
our “normative canon.” As such, I seek to advance an argument that a focus on the
changing nature of geography’s practical applications warrants attention for
understanding ongoing challenges that the discipline faces and where we as geographers
might take the discipline. Specifically, I examine the importance and changing nature of
applied geography; that is the application of geographical thinking and techniques outside
of boundaries of the academy. As a piece of historical geographical research, I examine
2

the importance of representation and abstraction to aiding in business decisions around
insurance underwriting (Chapter 2) and site selection (Chapter 3). Underlying these
empirics is an attention to the development and priorities of the discipline in the era of
study. Thus, this thesis ties together these historical moments with the emphasis of the
discipline today, seeking to understand how we might continue to advance the discipline.
By tying historical geography to the history of geography, I tread along a wellworn path. The Presidential Addresses of the American Association of Geographers have
long served as a way for individual scholars to contextualize their view of the discipline,
illuminating its flaws and shortcomings, and charting a course towards an improved
version. In short, they are a ready body of literature documenting the “course corrections”
that have made geography what it is today (Brunn, 2018). 1 Coming in yearly installments
from scholars of varying interests, networks, preferences, and the like, each address
presents a personalized snapshot of the discipline in that particular time. In the pages to
come, I explore the Presidential Addresses of two prominent geographers, Carl Sauer and
Ronald Abler.
As one of geography’s so-called “larger than life” figures, Carl Sauer’s brand of
geography has long been investigated for imparting a particular epistemological
worldview into the discipline, one that prioritized field study to understand the
development of a particular landscape (Entrikin, 1984). This concept, and the larger idea
of the cultural landscape, were critical to the formation of the versions of cultural and

1 I use the appropriate name of the AAG during the time period in which I am writing about, i.e.
the Association of American Geographers for before 2016 and the American Association of
Geographers for 2016 on.
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historical geography that dominated much of mainstream human geography in the postWorld War II era to until the late 1990s (Groth and Bressi, 1997).
Perhaps the first historical geographer to embrace the label; Sauer’s address,
entitled “Foreword to Historical Geography,” argued for a geographical discipline based
on a marriage of space and time, seeking to understand the currents of activity on the
surface of the Earth, from the physical processes that altered the land to the creatures
which inhabited and developed culture on the land’s surface (Sauer, 1941). Speaking
roughly a half century since the formation of an academic endeavor labeled as
“geography,” Sauer sought to provide clarity to both his own methods and the larger
structure of the discipline. In opening the address, Sauer asserted that his speech was “a
protest against the neglect of historical geography” but rather was a response to the
version of the discipline outlined by Richard Hartshorne’s 1939 book The Nature of
Geography which had largely relegated historical geography to edges of the discipline
(Sauer, 1941, 1-2). Dismayed at the decline of physical geography and the continued
fracturing of geography, Sauer charted a version of the discipline’s history that arose out
of a particular set of circumstances imparting on geography birthmarks pointing to its
origin. His address encouraged regionalism as articulated by Hartshorne (with a strong
dose of history of course), with a call to find this knowledge through situated experiences
in the field. In short, it was a call for a vision of the discipline, which would prove to be
premonitory over the next decade.
As Sauer outlined his view of the discipline at the Annual Meeting in Baton
Rouge, much of the world was engulfed in the opening salvos of the Second World War.
By the 1941 Annual Meeting, the United States would be a war with the Axis powers,
4

and geographers with specific regional interests would find their expertise in demand by
the federal government. By the close of the war—and with the horrors of the Holocaust
revealed for the entire world to see—Sauer’s version of geography had both the practical
utility and philosophical underpinnings to chart a new direction for the discipline in the
post-war years, specifically around regional studies and fieldwork. This view of the
disciple produced a pipeline of geographers to serve the growing national security
apparatus that became crucial to the Cold War geopolitical paradigm (Barnes and Farish,
2006).
Nearly a half century after Sauer’s address, another Presidential Address mirrored
similar concerns. Ronald Abler’s 1987 address came on the heels of another pressing
crisis for the discipline, namely the closure of the geography departments at Columbia,
Northwestern, and the University of Chicago (Abler, 1987). Reeling from the
discontinuance of graduate training in the loftiest of American higher education
institutions, Abler felt there was a need to recalibrate the discipline towards a more
wholistic view of that fostered an active physical geography branch, that fully embraced
the emerging subdiscipline of GIS, and that expanded geography’s audience to include
academics, educators, and practitioners (Abler, 1987, 520). Reflecting on the changing
nature of the discipline, which had spent two decades developing Marxist and feminist
geographies, he also argued for a pragmatic return to regional studies, which would reexpand the discipline and return it to its rightful heritage. Abler, then writing as a
Professor of Geography at Penn State, the President of the Association of American
Geographers, and the director of the National Science Foundation’s geography division
provided him unique insight into how the discipline might move forward. Indeed, Abler
5

would go to become the Executive Director of the Association of American Geographers
from 1990 to 2003. Thus, his address was a premonition of what was to come in the
discipline, or at a minimum, a version of how the discipline might evolve. In the thirtythree years since, aspects of his address have been readily taken up, with the development
of an active and robust physical geography and GIS subdisciplines, which have thrived in
the neoliberal academy due to their perceived practicality. Others, such as an overt return
to regional geography as a dominant paradigm within the discipline, have not
materialized reflecting the changing needs of society after the end of the Cold War.
Strikingly however, attention to cartographic representation was present in both
addresses. As a tool of representation, cartography and maps are one of geography’s most
readily understood and practical contributions to society. Both Sauer and Abler,
geographers whose main focus was not in cartography, saw the map as a practical utility
for the discipline. For Sauer, the map was an item to be consulted either for its archival
merit or constructed to highlight the development of a phenomenon (Sauer, 1941, 14).
For Abler, the map was a by-product of a GIS process that would bring visual clarity to a
wide variety of topics through advanced geographic data storage, processing, and
manipulation (Abler, 1987, 514-515). In both addresses, representation via the map was a
useful utility to express geographic principles and create job opportunities for
geographers.
Yet historically, cartography had long been maligned within the discipline. While
cartography has its roots as an organized practice in the sixteenth century, as an academic
endeavor, cartographic research was taken up fairly late even within geography.
Geographers such as J.P. Goode and Erwin Raisz formalized the practical importance of
6

cartography before the Second World War, with significant impacts in the classroom but
little in the way of research (McMaster and McMaster, 2002). After the Second World
War, Arthur Robinson married theory and practice together in cartography, articulating a
more scientific version of the practice over the artistic version that had existed before.
Through various metrics, models, and theories his work and this epistemological lens
came to dominate cartographic research throughout the 1950s until the rise of desktop
GIS computing in the 1990s. This analytical cartography was largely interested in
creating maps quickly, with higher accuracy, and with greater clarity, and understanding
how perceptually these processes worked (Robinson, 1953). This epistemology set
cartography apart from the regional Sauerian work which dominated throughout the
1950s and the critical work which emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. In some sense,
Robinson’s approach saw cartography as a methodological practice needing constant
revision. The emphasis was largely on producing a better product to better understand the
world from the cartographer’s point of view, not on understanding and communicating
the underlying processes that made a map into a visual representation of the world.
This view of cartography found a ready place in growth of state-sponsored higher
education in the post-war era, which embraced cartography for its practical utility. Private
universities, on the other hand, saw robust cartographic research programs as largely
unnecessary to their core mission (Dunbar, 1986). For example, when it had a program,
Harvard had numerous cartographers on its payroll, yet none were ever tenure-track
faculty. At Clark in the late 1970s, after the departure of two-tenure track appointments in
cartography, Mark Monmonier was considered for a faculty position. Ultimately, the
position was not filled as members of the Clark faculty felt that Monmonier’s research
7

output was not equivalent to other Clark faculty members and that his appointment would
signal “that Clark is going into cartography as a field of specialization in a big way”
(WAK [Assumed to be William A. Koelsch], 1978, 2). 2
Even the establishment of the Harvard Lab for Computer Graphics in 1965, while
a major factor in the development of digital mapping, did little to improve the fortunes of
cartography in the discipline. While from the outside it may have seemed that geography
was back at Harvard, it was far more of a return of a small subfield of the discipline than
a full-fledged embrace. With money from the Ford Foundation to “raise the performance
level of professional persons in city and regional planning and related fields”, the center’s
objectives made it a key locus in quantitative geography and digital mapping, but little
else in the realm of geography emerged (Wilson, 2017, 57). The departure of William
Warntz in 1970, along with the rise of Marxist geography, led to a significant decline in
the intellectual importance of this center of the discipline and to its attempt at improving
the fortunes of cartography. Over the next twenty-one years, the center would continue to
produce new geographic software that was formative to the emergence of digital
mapping. Utilizing the money from its sales to continue to fund the center until 1991, this
established a business model for GIS software and cartographic education in higher
education which would prove important to the future of the discipline. This neoliberal
model placed practical utility as measured by monetary income from which to justify the
continued existence of such units.

2 The departing professors were George McCleary and Kang-Tsung Chang. Both were on the
faculty for less than a decade and were the only tenure-track appointments in cartography in
Clark’s history to that point.
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By the time of Abler’s address in 1987, the fortunes of cartography were
beginning to change. Digital cartographic applications were entering the business and
academic community in force. ESRI, then a multi-million-dollar company, had already
introduced its first desktop GIS ARC/INFO in 1982, which was making inroads in the
academic and business community. Clark University, which had decided not to
emphasize cartography in 1978, changed course and hired J. Ronald Eastman to teach in
1981—albeit in a Visiting Assistant Professor role—before hiring him into a tenure-track
position in 1986 (Eastman, 2014). This change in direction came on the heels of
Eastman’s development of the GIS software IDRISI and the establishment of Clark Labs,
which in a model similar to Harvard, financed the development of a GIS research
program through the sale of software (Eastman, 2003, 2). By the turn of the millennium,
this “pay-to-play” GIS model would be well entrenched in the subdiscipline, turning
geography departments into consumers of expensive ESRI products and advanced
hardware. Increasingly, these “pay-to-play” models were extended to education, with
Penn State establishing the first online-only GIS program in 1999, largely funded through
government-sponsored training in defense and homeland security (Goldsberry, 2019). 3
Of course, this change did not come without notice. Abler’s address only added
fuel onto the flames of the growing power of desktop GIS and the ongoing personal
computing revolution in the discipline. Indeed, the next American Association of
Geographers President, Terry Jordan, wrote that GIS had the potential to transform the
discipline into a “race of technicians, for-hire scientists, and teacher-trainers” (Crampton

The list of online GIS programs is too numerous to list, however there are more than 20
different online programs available as of 2020.
3
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and Wilson, 2015; Jordan, 1988). To remain relevant cartography labs suddenly required
immense sums of money to construct adequate teaching and research spaces and along
with this came new tenure lines to support the teaching of GIS. Combined with the
already negative attitudes towards cartography, even present at eminent public
institutions with leadership in cartography and GIS such as the University of Wisconsin,
the rest of the discipline was unprepared for the major shift that was already occurring. 4
As the economics of the discipline began to change, it became clear that this new wave of
money for GIS research and teaching represented a definitive shift in the structure of the
discipline. Combined with end of the Cold War, infighting between critical geographers,
and the decline of regional studies; concerns emerged that GIS might be a second
Quantitative Revolution that could sweep away two generations of critical work. Starting
in the early 1990s, critiques informed by geographers drew attention to problematic
issues with GIS, notably spilling over on the pages of prominent journals and
contributing to the “science wars” of the era (Openshaw, 1991; Schuurman, 2000; Smith,
1992).
At the same time, there was a stirring within the history of cartography towards a
more theoretically informed understanding of maps. Mainly an outgrowth of the rare
maps trade and the construction of map libraries, much of subdiscipline was focused
around bibliography and description of historic maps. Although earlier generation of

4 As a PhD student at Wisconsin in the late 1980s, Matthew Edney was slighted by noncartographic faculty members stating that “…the continual denigration of maps and mapping in
the seminar on geographic thought required of all doctoral students . . .[and] the absolute
refusal—until it became a matter of raising external funds—to deal with remote sensing and
geographic information systems, which were otherwise dismissed as merely applied technologies
with no intellectual merit…” were commonplace during his graduate career (Edney, 2019, 82).
This sentiment has been reflected by other cartographers as well.
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academic cartographers in the 1950s and 1960s had been expected to address some topic
in the history of cartography as part of their training, this was mainly a pro forma
requirement with a lack of coordinated research inquiry. This orientation left the history
of cartography without a unified body of thought that connected it to academic discourse
in geography. Yet by the 1970s this disordered nature within the history of cartography
began to change. David Woodward, a Robinson graduate from Wisconsin who served as
the head of the cartographic library at the Newberry Library, and John Brian Harley, a
British scholar who held a variety of academic posts in the United Kingdom and
eventually at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, began to produce scholarship that
addressed systems of mass cartographic production (such as the UK’s Ordnance Survey)
and lay the intellectual foundations of the history of cartography as an academic endeavor
(Harley, 1968; Woodward, 1974). The two would work together to establish the History
of Cartography project in 1981, which continues today working to chart the history of
cartographic practice from prehistory to the twentieth century (“History – History of
Cartography Project,” n.d.).
Yet by the late 1980s, Harley’s work sought to understand the larger enterprise of
cartography in terms of its impact upon the world. These later works by Harley were
informed by French theorists like Michel Foucault who were readily gaining steam in the
academy at large. Harley’s Deconstructing the Map, published in 1989, came to be
recognized as a significant touchstone in the development of cartographic theory to come
(Harley, 1989). In the 1990s, as new cultural geography began to form in the discipline,
more nuanced accountings of axes of difference emerged as a central paradigm to
geographical scholarship, and the critical deconstruction of various knowledge paradigms
11

began (Mitchell, 1995). While Harley’s premature death in 1991 prevented him from
continuing to contribute to these emerging paradigms, geographers were quick to turn to
his work to construct a new field of inquiry around maps and geospatial technologies.
As skirmishes over the role of the GIS in the discipline turned into a ‘science
war’, geographers worked to establish a détente within the discipline. With funding from
the National Science Foundation, a meeting at Friday Harbor, Washington was convened
between GIScientists and human geographers. The outcome of meeting was a better
understanding between a subset of both factions and is often seen as the beginning of
critical GIS and cartography (Crampton and Wilson, 2015; Schuurman, 2000). While
these meetings and the subsequent fields have not fully healed the riff between human
geography and GIScientists, this bridge-building work has gone a long way to building a
better understanding between various factions of geographers. Also springing from this
meeting was a desire to better integrate mapping and mapping technologies into society,
to socially ground them in the needs, desires, and interests of the people. This led to the
beginning of public participatory GIS and more nuanced understandings of the impacts of
geospatial information. In a similar vein, Gwendolyn Warren and Bill Bungee’s radical
mapping work with the Detroit Geographic Expedition in the 1960s and Bungee’s
Nuclear War Atlas of the 1980s were rediscovered, providing historical examples of
potential and radical ways to move forward (Bunge, 2011, 1989). Other work examined
the marketing utility of GIS and its impact on individual privacy rights (Pickles, 1995). In
other words, this was a diverse and burgeoning field that sought to understand the role of
geospatial information beyond merely the construction of the map.

12

Thus the emergence of critical GIS and critical cartography throughout the 1990s
and early 2000s signaled a greater engagement not only with the legacy of the
Quantitative Revolution, but also the emerging digital technologies and theories of
cartographic production (Barnes, 2009). As such, this thesis pulls from this legacy,
focusing on role of geospatial information as an economic practice, tying in what might
traditionally be perceived as scholarship in historical geography to illustrate its points.
Using a historical lens, it seeks to understand the role that this information has played in
insurance underwriting and spurring economic development in two different contexts. It
employs what Matthew Edney has recently termed the “procedural approach” to
cartography: this largely replaces the history of cartography with its bibliographic
description with a processual history that seeks to understand a map for all the steps that
go into creating it (Edney, 2019). In the process, Edney seeks to jettison the field of the
“history of cartography” and the term “cartography,” replacing them with “map studies”
and “map” (Edney, 2019). While providing a new framework for an understanding of
map history, this more broadly provides a framework for understanding the use of
geographic information in society. The processual approach shares much in common with
the concept of practice—that is an understanding of how and why individuals and entities
respond to various situations in similar ways. For example, the processual approach seeks
to interrogate everything from training of the cartographer, the mode of map production,
the circulation network of the map, the industrial network the maps producers were
located within, and so on. The processual approach is a never-ending story in the sense
that a map and its meaning is always becoming and unbecoming. Thus, understanding the
processual practice of the use of geographic information in commercial settings provides
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a unique understanding of the overall importance of this information to the larger
functioning of the economy. The processual framework also importantly enables a more
flexible framework to incorporate the work of different scholars. Geography is among the
whitest of all social sciences, and subfields such as a cartography are still largely
dominated by white male scholars. The processual approach is as much of an intellectual
mindset as it is a framework for understanding the changing nature and interpretation of
geographic information. In other words, the processual approach opens the door to
diverse and innovative ways of understanding the map.
Against this backdrop, the two chapters of this thesis stand in defense of this line
of inquiry. Chapter Two examines the history of fire insurance mapping in the current
state of Oklahoma, seeking to understand how a settler-colonial state assessed fire risk
and underwrote development from the late 1880s to the 1910s. As such, this chapter
mainly falls in the realm of historical geography and map studies. Here regimes of risk
management are explored for their impact on both the state of Oklahoma and in the larger
context of the Sanborn Map Company. The chapter also explores how fire insurance
mapping during this period reflected the speculative nature of development and capital
during this era.
Chapter Three seeks to deepen this engagement with commercial entities more
explicitly through the exploration of the organization and use of geographic information
in business. As such the chapter explores the biography of William Applebaum, an
applied geographer whose work in the supermarket industry helped to introduce mass
retailing to the United States. Also detailed is the key role Applebaum played in the
development of the first American intelligence agency and his intellectual influence and
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mentorship which continues to have an impact on both the discipline of geography and
the American built environment. Applebaum’s story challenges dominate narratives of
the history of discipline, providing a story of a marginalized, Jewish, quasi-academic
applied geographer, whose influence in his era arguably had a larger impact outside of
the discipline than inside of it. This history illustrates how understanding practice outside
of the academy is important to understanding the larger uses of geographic information,
and how the value of geographic information in commercial contexts is leveraged to
make significant decisions. The thesis concludes by illuminating possible future research
activities to further engagement between these two fields and ponders the value and
future of the discipline.
To be clear, this thesis is not explicitly about applied or business geography in the
sense in which they are practiced today. In fact, I would assert that there is no distinct
subfield of applied” or “business” geography. These are topical and empirical concerns
that are useful nomenclatures for a particular set of scholarship that employs specific
methodologies towards specific aims. In other words, what as currently seen as applied
and business geographies is merely a reflection of what we deem as “applied” and
“business” related (Roepke, 1977). Rather, in this thesis, I seek to advance an argument
about the utility and practice of geography, not necessarily for its value in contributing to
academic discourse but rather in shaping the whole of human society. Specifically, this is
achieved by bringing applied/business geography and cartography into conversation with
critical geography to highlight the ways in which all of geography is imbricated in the
operations of society.
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The fracturing of the discipline into four general subfields and many smaller
specialties, is an advantageous feature of geography, allowing geographers to claim
relevancy around a wide variety of topics. However, some of the glaring shortcomings of
the discipline are reflected in this decentralized approach to intellectual inquiry. In other
words, without a general focus of the discipline’s work, our impact on society is more
muted and harder to articulate. Cartography is an excellent example of this issue. Maps
are perhaps the most readily identifiable product of the discipline, yet research into
cartographic issues is not at the core of applied geographies nor at the core of most
geographer’s research interests. Indeed, as previous sections have shown, there has been
an active distain for cartography in the discipline. Why is this? Why would (do) some
geographers slight what is our most ready contribution to society?
I believe the answer is less about animosity towards different research agendas
(even if the interpersonal and departmental politics indicate to the contrary) but rather
about the differing goals of each endeavor. The divide between geography and
cartography is that between the theory/methods/empirics of documenting a specific place
and the practice of implementing these theory/methods/empirics to represent a specific
place. The practice of cartographic techniques takes one away from the work of
geography, i.e. the documentation of place, and thus has been seen as lesser. The irony,
of course, is that geography has largely adopted the techniques and methods of other
disciplines to better understand geographical topics.
Doubly ironic is the fact that even though the final outputs are different, the
standards academic geographers work to produce are largely the same. To put it another
way, cartography professors do not get tenure for publishing maps but rather for writing
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about the practice of maps, in the way an urban geographer is expected to write on urban
topics. Moreover, the same educational infrastructure that produces the seemingly
“unemployable” geography major also produces the “employable” cartographer (along
with a whole host of other beneficial and problematic things). On the level of the
individual geographer, it is possible for one to embrace these differing epistemologies
and methods, producing various matrixes of research that constitute the field known as
“geography.” Indeed, as Chapter 3 shows, geographers can embody these practices in a
variety of ways.
In a time period where critical scholarship is making inroads into discussions of
everyday life, critiques of the carceral state or gentrification or the spatial economics of
the healthcare industry are not just “thought pieces” but important contributions to the
understanding of society’s problems. At the same time, scholarship written under the
guise of applied or business-related work, may run counterintuitive to other efforts within
the discipline and increase inequalities and injustice. One of the points of this thesis is to
point out the inherent contradictions between applied and business geographies and other
aims of geographical research, using the role of geographic information to understand the
discipline’s impact outside of the academy.
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CHAPTER 2. MAPPING RISK IN OKLAHOMA AND INDIAN TERRITORIES: THE RIVALRY
BETWEEN THE CLARKSON RATING BUREAU AND THE SANBORN MAP COMPANY, 18901915
2.1

Introduction
In 1893, historian Fredrick Jackson Turner delivered what has become of one

most enduring historical analyses in American history. His thesis argued that with the
announcement of the closure of the American frontier by the Census Bureau in 1890 (that
is white settlement and control of land formerly occupied by Indigenous peoples) the end
of first chapter of American history had been marked (Turner, 1893). Moving forward,
the United States would be entering a new historical epoch, the character of which, in
1893, was unknown. Turner lamed the closing of the frontier, arguing that the essence of
frontier life had defined the character and operation of the nation.
In Turner’s history, poor settlers found economic prosperity. Immigrants formed
communities and integrated in the nation’s fabric. Democratic values and forms of
governance were put to the test as newly formed communities developed the basics of a
functioning society to maintain order. Success led to urbanization and new forms of
economic and social development. And when the newly settled land had ceased to be new
and stopped providing the opportunities it had for its first (white) inhabitants, citizens
picked up and moved to the new frontier to start the process over and hope to find “life,
liberty, and pursuit of happiness.” And for a century, starting in the bluegrass of
Kentucky and marching west, the citizens of the United States had played out this same
narrative across the North American continent.
Now, from the lens of the present, the limitations of Turner’s analysis are
painfully obvious. In addition to its reductive nature, it ignores or delegitimizes the
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contributions of enslaved persons, individuals of various ethnicities (both white and nonwhite), and non-male individuals. It erases the Indigenous peoples of the continent,
placing their very existence as a historical artifact of human evolution, asserting that their
ultimate subjugation to the American government and white society was a foregone
conclusion that could have been predicted from the beginning. And above all it places the
white, male settler in the limelight of history; making their story the center billing of the
historical narrative.
While the conclusions of Turner’s analysis have been widely panned by modern
scholars, both within geography and history, for a simplistic view of historical narrative
and the development of society and a lack of attention to Indigenous and other minority
groups, his work still stands as a bellwether within American historical scholarship
(Cronon, 1987). His thesis has become as much of a historical moment itself as the recent
history he sought contextualize in 1893; it marked a break between an America largely
focused on internal affairs and continental territorial control to the beginning of a rising
American nation-state, deeply imbricated in world trade and global affairs. It marked, in
some sense, a mastery of a supposed continental destiny and the beginning phases of the
emergence of a new global order with the United States at its center. Delivered in
Chicago during the highly influential World’s Fair, which articulated an immense number
of American innovations (everything from electricity to city planning), the thesis touches
upon the nature of (white) American society at that time (Burg, 2014). Wiggish
approaches to American history aside, Turner’s thesis articulated a form of social and
economic development of the nation, one where the vastness “emptiness” of the west
operated a form of pressure release, allowing the nation to develop peacefully.
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The point of utilizing Turner in the introduction of this chapter is not to advance
Turner’s thesis as a mode of analysis, but rather to pick up the historical-geographic
narrative he utilized. While Turner was a historian by trade, he interfaced extensively
with early geographers. He had training in the study of maps, and his education skirted
along the edges of early academic geography at the University of Wisconsin and at Johns
Hopkins University (Block, 1980). Moreover, his conceptual framework for migration
and economic development proved to be a jumping off point for geographers looking to
explore these topics (Gelfand, 1954; Kearns, 1984). Turner, and his frontier thesis, thus is
part and parcel of a particular set of circumstances reflecting the changing political forces
of the United States, the rise of industrialization and modern capitalism, the increasing
role of statistics and mapping in the orderly operations in (white) society. What this
chapter of the thesis seeks to do is similarly use Turner’s thesis as a jumping off point to
understand the impact of white, western capital—as expressed through insurance
mapping—in one of last territories open for white settlement.
At the center of the 1890 Census and Turner’s thesis was the disappearance of the
American frontier. From the lens of the Manifest Destiny, this was the settling of the
North American continent, what we today know as the lower-forty-eight states of the
United States. The last of these territories open for white settlement in 1889 was what
would become the state of Oklahoma, then divided into two separate territories,
Oklahoma Territory and Indian Territory. Thus, the machine that was settler colonial
capitalism found one last “unsettled” territory to exploit, just in time for the Census
Bureau to declare the end of the American frontier.
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This chapter explores importance of speed, capital, and economies in the map
publishing business in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While all maps
have their own economies of production, in this chapter I want to examine how the “onthe-ground” processes of development manifested in the production and circulation of
geographic information. The linkages between economic development and cartography
are a deep and a mutually co-constructive process, and while the map may not be the
territory, it is a snapshot of the territory and often its economy. In this chapter, I examine
the “cartographic interplay” between two map producers in pre-statehood Oklahoma,
charting the development of both territories with the importance of accurate and up-todate geographic information for use in the fire insurance industry. These two
companies—one a major national producer of maps and the second an upstart local
inspection bureau—churned out hundreds of maps and map updates known as
“corrections” in an approximately twenty-year period from 1894 to 1914. The larger
genre of insurance mapping is also examined, contextualizing the development of this
form of mapping in the broader history of insurance. I conclude by contextualizing the
role of risk in economic development, and the broader implications of this for the
discipline.
As a field of scholarship, critical cartography’s mode of inquiry has largely
focused around the social power of maps (Crampton, 2001). In this chapter, I explore the
economic implications of fire insurance mapping, charting the importance of accurate
geographic information to the emergence of settler-colonial economics. Although
geography as a discipline in higher education was in the process of forming in this period,
the cartographic impulse for greater accuracy and detail is very much present in this
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chapter. In Oklahoma and Indian Territory, cartographers and surveyors raced against
each other to supply the most up-to-date and accurate information to ensure that the
insurance industry could accurately underwrite risk.
It is also important to note that this chapter mainly highlights the stories of white,
capitalist, settler men. While Indigenous peoples were directly impacted in this process,
the enterprise of mapping in Oklahoma (like in many other places), is dominated by
white people. As numerous scholars have documented, the mapping of Indigenous
peoples is almost always an extension of the colonial project (Palmer and Rundstrom,
2013; Rundstrom, 1995). Indigenous cartographies do exist however their maps speak to
an entirely different epistemological project than the setter-colonial, capitalistic desires of
much of western mapping. As territories, Oklahoma and Indian Territories were subject
to their own conflicting tensions that were by-products of Indigenous removal to an
unfamiliar territory and an apathetic hostility from the American government. These
tensions over the division and establishment of reservations, the creation of Oklahoma
counties, the drawing out of individual property lines and so on fall outside the scope of
this chapter.
2.2

Methodology and Sources:
This chapter mixes methods from archival research and basic quantification to

provide the evidence for many of the claims. Out of necessity, the mixing of these
methods provides unique insight on both the larger processes of the fire insurance
industry and the speculative development of Oklahoma during this time. Fire insurance
history has not been written with any frequency, much less so for its impact in specific
geographic regions, which complicates the interpretation of this material. Moreover,
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archival material related to the entities described in this chapter are virtually nonexistent
apart from the maps that have been preserved in libraries and archives. This work thus
uses the remaining maps as the primary archival record from which this argument is
constructed (Uhl et al., 2018).
Much in the way cultural geographers “read” the landscape to understand the
influences enacted upon it, this chapter uses the corpus of archival maps to read maps ata-distance, providing a novel way of extracting information from where there is a dearth
of information (Lewis, 1979). In some sense it utilizes a data analytics approach to read
between the lines to understand the major currents in the production of these maps,
similar to those in the history of the book (Kirschenbaum, 2007). After an early period in
the late 1860s, the historical record of Sanborn’s production becomes murky. Between
1868 and March 1884, the company did not copyright its maps, leaving a hole in the
historical record. Moreover, while the current iteration of the Sanborn Map Company
apparently has a small corporate archive, records from this early era were not maintained.
Thus, “reading” Sanborn and Clarkson maps based on their metadata provides additional
data via proxy to understand and contextualize their production. This approach mirrors
digital humanities approaches that seek to discover new knowledge via digital mediums,
especially around spatial history (Knowles and Hillier, 2008; White, 2010). In other
words, this is meta-mapping as a method.
A significant aspect of the methodology used to undergird this argument pulls
from the field of digital humanities. Emerging in the early 2000s and 2010s, this field
applied technology to traditional humanities topics in order to gain new interpretations of
the past. These “distant readings,” meta-analyses, and new visualizations have enabled
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scholars to both observe new patterns and reach new audiences with their scholarship
(Unamuno, 2017). In geography, digital humanities has manifested itself mainly in the
field of spatial history and the use of GIS. Here the spatial insight gleaned from
humanistic data have enriched our understanding of various phenomenon and developed
a new set of tools and uses for GIS. While there are significant limitations—especially in
representing non-Euclidean space, expressing uncertainty, and in the limits of the spatial
database—these new uses have enabled a new form of view humanities topics (Bergmann
and Lally, 2020).
In the context of this project, this approach is highly important. Both Sanborn and
Clarkson left few traditional archival records from which to understand the organization
of their surveying practices. There are few surveyor records, corporate correspondence,
or financial documents to examine. The largest part of these archival records is seemingly
the least important in crafting a narrative to contextualize the process of mapping—that is
maps themselves. Here, even the archival landscape of maps is highly variegated:
hundreds of editions of Clarkson maps, many used and annotated, exist in the holdings of
the Oklahoma Historical Society while pristine copyright deposits of Sanborn maps exist
at the Library of Congress and the University of Oklahoma. It is an incomplete archival
record that prioritizes the detailed information of historical landscape itself over the
process of map creation.
In lieu of these valuable archival materials, reading the metadata of a corpus of
maps constitutes the creation of its own archive. The metadata for a standard fire
insurance map is simple: in addition to the name of the town and its location, the date the
map was created and the number of sheets is also recorded. From these seemingly scant
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records it is possible to construct a “meta-map” documenting the spatial organization of
these mapping firms, highlighting both the importance of the settlements being surveyed
and the internal organization of the mapping company. This is easier to perform for the
Sanborn maps as multiple sources exist to harvest the metadata, and the metadata was
initially captured when Sanborn submitted their maps for copyright deposit to the Library
of Congress. Additional metadata was generated when the duplicate copies of these maps
were circulated to individual state institutions in the 1960s and 1970s, led by the map
library at University of California, Berkeley. 5
The archival records of Clarkson maps prove more difficult to extract this type of
data from due to their use in the underwriting business and their donation in mass to the
Oklahoma Historical Society after their practical use had disappeared. However, the need
for access and cataloging of these materials for the efficient organization of libraries
provides useful information for the digital humanist to analyze. Here data created by the
archivists of the Oklahoma Historical Society after the collection was donated proved
useful.
Utilizing the concepts of distant reading and mapping of the archive also shows
the overall significance of the spatial extent of cartographic production. In digital
humanities projects, maps and geospatial data are typically not critically interrogated for
their power, in a style familiar to critical cartographers (Gieseking, 2018). Using the
metadata of the map itself with a critical cartography lens in the creation a new map

5 Throughout this chapter, I utilize the information from Berkeley in constructing the graphs and
maps documenting the mapping process.
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provides a methodology from which to understand the process of mapping. Metamapping is a method to understand the spatial importance of mapping itself.
2.3

The Emergence of an Industry: Fire Insurance Cartography in the History of
Cartography
It is only in the past century and a half that large-quantity map publishers

emerged. For most of Western history, maps were privileged items reserved for those
with capital, education, or political influence. While these consumers were wealthy, the
publishers who compiled, engraved, published, and sold these maps were less privileged.
Where the map was a tool for others to increase or manage their power, for the publisher,
the map was an instrument of life, to sustain themselves and their families. Small firms
worked hand-in-hand with explorers, utilizing their data to employ highly-skilled
craftspersons and boutique suppliers to produce the graphic visualization that became a
map. Through the collation and display of this data, publishers created information,
which produced new value that could be exchanged for money. Yet the very process of
creating this information, like any business, was fraught with issues. In an era of
European colonization, maps frequently became out-of-date and older maps were
financial liabilities which threatened the publisher’s security (Pedley, 2005). In this
period before the easy reproduction of non-textual images, the production process of a
map combined with the rapid advance of new colonial knowledge meant that the
publishing of maps was a capital-intensive, marginal-profit business.
In practice, this meant that publishers frequently held onto their backstock as a
potential asset, mainly by transforming old maps into “new” maps by adding new
information and collating older maps into atlases for bulk sale (Bagrow, 2010). This
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model of cartographic production kept map prices high and the number of publishers low,
limiting competition for more advanced maps. By the early nineteenth century, this
picture has begun to change for a variety of reasons. First, the expansion of surveying and
civil engineering as fields of inquiry led to the development of skilled draftspersons who
could produce more accurate and large-scale maps, leading to more map sheets.
Secondly, changing models of paper production led to the emergence of more paper,
dropping the cost of publishing. At the same time advances in printing technology made
the production of larger quantities of maps possible as well. This moved the affordability
of maps “down-the-scale”, making them more available to other (still wealthy) entities
(Pedley, 2005). In practice, this meant that there were more uses for a map and a larger
supply of people and materials to produce additional maps, leading to the emergence of
maps in a variety of non-governmental and non-navigational industries.
One such industry which embraced the map was the fire insurance industry. In the
Anglo-American world, the first documented use of mapping practices in insurance was
after the 1666 Great Fire of London. Destroying much of central London, the economic
losses were staggering, and this ted to the formation of several nascent insurance
companies (Evans, 1987). The by-product of the fire was the introduction of new
measures to control and manage urban conflagrations including firefighting brigades,
building codes, and insurance mapping. These early maps were quite limited in their
scope, rendering a settlement and its buildings visible in the large-scale of 1 inch to 0.5
miles (Ristow, 1982). These maps would eventually document prevailing wind directions
and the type of water supply in the city, staples that remained on fire insurance maps well
into the twentieth century. Still, these maps were difficult and costly to construct.
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For example, the Phoenix Assurance Company of London emerged as one of the
largest insurers in the Anglo-American world and seems to have engaged in extensive
mapping efforts starting in the late eighteenth century, commissioning maps of their areas
of coverage. These ranged from a thirty-two sheet map of London developed from 1792
to 1799 to a single map of Charleston, South Carolina in 1790 (Ristow, 1982). As the
company’s North American liabilities grew, a director of the company Jenkin Jones, was
sent to gather “accurate topographical information” of North American cities. While he
seems to have gathered much relevant information about fire vulnerability in these cities
(including firefighting capabilities, water supply, the nature of the street layout, among
others), the cartographic output of this nearly two-year journey (while currently lost)
seems to have been quite small. The tenability of insurance firms meant that even the
largest, most sophisticated firms struggled to mobilize mapping technologies effectively
due to their high cost of production.
However, as surveying and papermaking advanced to enable the production of
more maps, the emergence of larger economies and the immense scale of development
led to changes in the insurance industry; mainly the consolidation of the industry and the
emergence of statistical methods. On this first point, the growth of cities and the
increasing size of fires led to a series of insurance crises in the early part of the nineteenth
century (Oviatt, 1905). In essence, a large fire would occur and smaller insurers would
find themselves without enough (or any) capital to cover their losses, leading to
bankruptcy for the company and no insurance payout for a policyholder. As Ristow
states, this mainly occurred in the United States after the New York City fire of 1835,
which led to the transition of a significant part of the insurance industry to Hartford,
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Connecticut (Ristow, 1982). The effect of this fire led to the establishment of new laws
requiring a reserve account to cover a standard amount of loss, to ensure that companies
could weather significant conflagrations. At the same time, the disruption of this fire and
the new laws encouraged the development of larger insurance firms, that took on more
geographically distributed risk, insulating both the firm and policyholder from financial
calamity (Baranoff, 1998). While evidence is scant, I also believe that this led to the
beginning of the reinsurance industry more broadly (Borscheid et al., 2013).
Reinsurance—that is, the process of insurers themselves being insured by larger
insurance companies—was combined with additional forms of risk management and
documentation, which included statistical modeling, insurance inspections, and mapping,
to manage risk of all types. Of these statistical modeling emerged as a particularly rich
area for most of the insurance industry.
In the nineteenth century insurance began to expand beyond maritime and fire, into
health, life, and property insurance more broadly. The development of statistics led to
manipulations in these forms of insurance, allowing companies to more accurately charge
premiums for “predictable” events. Highly used in life insurance, fire insurance
companies found that while statistical measures did to improve their business models,
there were limits on how effective numbers could be (Tebeau, 2012, 96). Generally,
insurers could calculate the risk of individual industries from conflagration: for example,
saloons were generally a higher risk entity to insure. However, unlike life insurance, risk
in the fire insurance industry manifested itself differently. While life insurers could
predict with some degree of certainty the risk of certain populations—and knew that
everyone would eventually die—fire insurance did not face the same risk calculations.
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Fires were geographically-specific events that were highly variable in their
intensity depending on the fire’s immediate surroundings, its general location in a city,
and in the firefighting operations of the city itself. Thus, while insurers could write a
higher risk policy for a saloon, a single-family home next door could be insured at a
much lower rate, even though the fire risk was nearly as high as the saloon due to their
proximity. While there was an emerging science to firefighting, fire-proof building, and
other fire prevention measures, calamity could strike easily (Tebeau, 2012, 256). For
example, the Baltimore fire of 1904 destroyed the city’s highly built-up, seemingly
inflammable central business district due to a lack of standardized firefighting equipment.
Two years later, the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and fire consumed much of the
highly flammable wooden city whose firefighting equipment, while advanced, was
hindered by the earthquake, allowing the fire to expand tremendously. In both examples,
buildings that were surrounded by fire survived while other highly engineered
“inflammable” buildings burned. Although these examples happened more than fifty
years after the development of statistical methods, they illuminate the difficulty insurers
faced in predicting these events and drawing generalizable laws or rules about the nature
of urban conflagrations.
The solution then was to address the unpredictability of fire through a geographic
model; to develop an art and science of fire insurance underwriting that took into
consideration the basic physical principles of fire, the local ability to fight fire, and the
building-specific information to craft policies that turned a profit while minimizing risk.
Under this model, the map served as the primary document from which to assess and
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document this risk at a distance, proving both the local and building-specific information
from which initial underwriting decisions were made (Tebeau, 2012, 103).
Yet again, the high costs of map production meant there was little coordinated
mapping efforts during this time. It was only in the late 1840s that fire insurance mapping
as a practice emerged in the United States. This first map, of New York City, was
commissioned by William Hope who had convinced various insurers located in the city
to co-sponsor the map’s production. This map, produced by William Perris, documented
the island of Manhattan and launched the beginning of an independent insurance industry
(Wright, 1983). While evidence is hard to come by, it seems that this process was
replicated across other major American cities, with local insurers banding together to
commission their own maps of their own cities. This model placed the emphasis on the
local, and thus the next major development in fire insurance mapping was the
establishment of a firm that could coordinate mapping on a national scale with a uniform
set of standards. That company would emerge as the standard of fire insurance mapping
under the name of the Sanborn Map Company.
2.4

The Emergence of the Sanborn Map as an Industry Standard
Trained as a surveyor, Daniel Alfred Sanborn obtained his start working as an in-

house surveyor for the Aetna Insurance Company (Ristow, 1982). At the close of the
Civil War, Sanborn was dispatched to map a number of towns in Tennessee. Realizing
that there was a market for these maps, he founded his own company under the name
D.A. Sanborn National Insurance Diagram Bureau in 1867. The first set of maps of
Boston (Library of Congress) were subsequently followed by volumes for Charlestown
and Cambridge (Boston Public Library) and maps of Chicago (Newberry Library and
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Boston Public Library). Within a few years, Sanborn’s company had truly established a
national presence with known examples from towns as small as Williamsport,
Pennsylvania (Williamsport Historical Society) and Kearny, Nebraska (Nebraska
Historical Society). 6
Although Sanborn Map Company records do not exist for the nineteenth century,
it is clear that the approach of the company was in three-parts:
a) ally themselves with a national insurance companies like Aetna who would buy
their products in bulk,
b) leave the major cities with individual cooperatives to map themselves, and
c) focus on providing maps of smaller towns and cities across the United States.
This three-part model is reflected in career of Daniel Carter Beard, who was
employed with Sanborn from 1874 to 1878 (Beard, 1939). Better known for his later
career as the co-founder of the Boy Scouts of America, one of Beard’s early jobs was
with Sanborn as a surveyor. His papers, preserved in the Library of Congress’s
Manuscript Division, may be the only records related to the company’s early days that
reflect the perspective of the surveyor. In his role as a surveyor, Beard was sent across the
American South and Midwest mapping cities as small as Dalton, Georgia (population
1,809 in 1870) to as large as Cleveland, Ohio (Batts and Queen, 2012). In this role, Beard

6 An important methodological note here: apart from the first Boston atlas in 1867, Sanborn did
not regularly begin copyrighting their maps until 1884. Moreover, apart from atlases where the
title page stated they were a Sanborn product, individual sheet maps for smaller towns and cities
were not stamped with the Sanborn label. This means that there likely is a number of early,
unmarked, and undocumented Sanborn maps. I have confirmed some of the maps listed in this
section as consistent with other known Sanborn maps based on their symbology.
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brought Sanborn’s business strategy to bear on the world. His correspondence with
company headquarters in New York City discusses the needs of individual insurance
firms, their role in selecting which settlements were to be mapped, competition from
other firms that threatened to undercut their product, and ways to improve their product.
While a larger analysis of the Beard papers reveals additional insight into the production
process of fire insurance maps, this falls outside of the scope of this chapter.
Regardless by the mid-1880s, Sanborn was one of a number of independent firms
that produced fire insurance maps in the United States. A short accounting of these other
major firms and their geographic extent is as follows (Ristow, 1968):
•

Perris-Brown: New York City and Newark, New Jersey

•

Hexamer: Philadelphia and industrial sites in eastern Pennsylvania,
Delaware, and southern New Jersey

•

Rascher: Chicago, Illinois

•

Whipple: St. Louis, Missouri and surrounding towns

•

Dakin: Primarily California, but large cities in Oregon, Washington,
Idaho, Montana, Utah, and Arizona, and British Columbia, Canada

Competition was enhanced by advances in printing images. The introduction and
widespread adoption of lithography for printing images meant that printing one’s own
maps had become affordable enough for individuals to do so. For example, in mid-1880s,
a firm by the name of Scarlett & Scarlett mapped towns along the upper Delaware River
Valley in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Their maps, published in the same year as their
Sanborn counterparts, are nearly identical to one another (Figure 2.1 and 2.2).
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Figure 2.1 Comparison of fire insurance maps for Lehighton, Pennsylvania, 1887.
Top is the edition issued by Sanborn. Bottom is issued by Scarlett & Scarlett. (Maps
from Donald W. Hamer Center for Maps & Geospatial Information, Penn State)
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Figure 2.2 Comparison of the extent of Sanborn and Scarlett & Scarlett Maps for
Lehighton. Blue outline is Sanborn, orange outline is Scarlett & Scarlett. (Aerial
imagery from PASDA).
Whether these were direct cases of plagiarism, examples of surveyors who
“double-dipped” and sold their own brand of maps on Sanborn’s dime, or were a shortlived competitor, it is clear that the insurance mapping market had become saturated with
firms. Other forms of saturation include a major copyright case over the usage of symbols
between Perris-Brown of New York and their protégée Hexamer & Sons in Philadelphia
that made its way to the United States Supreme Court in 1878 (Rosen, 2018).
At the same time, new professional organizations related to fire insurance began
to emerge that also posed a threat to the industry. Informal local organizations, which had
sponsored many of the first mapping efforts, developed into more formal clubs which met
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to coordinate insurance rates and policies in their individual areas of interest, both
geography and industry specific. These ranged in size from individual cities to entire
regions. While many of these firms did not actively engage in mapping on a regular basis,
they would engage an individual surveyor to map smaller settlements that a major firm
was unwilling to map (Tebeau, 2012). “Inspection bureaus” also emerged as a viable
alternative to mapping companies. These entities, which were split between non-profit
and for-profit companies, specialized in providing detailed inspections of risk for
industrial sites and towns, issued detailed diagrams of factories, mapped smaller
settlements, and provided up-to-date information to insurers. In other words, these
bureaus provided specialized service that Sanborn could not engage in or was unwilling
to do so, allowing even the smallest of white settlements to gain insurance protection.
With all of these competitors, the industry began to consolidate, with Sanborn
emerging as essentially the single insurance mapping company in the United States by
the beginning of the First World War (Ristow, 1968). This monopoly was established in a
number of ways. First, Sanborn’s earlier corporate strategy made it the largest of the fire
insurance map firms in terms of its geographic coverage, and thus it was able to handle
changes in the marketplace the best. Secondly, Sanborn worked closely with insurers
themselves who were rapidly expanding as the United States urbanized and developed
economically. This close relationship manifested itself in the ownership of the company,
with much of the Sanborn Map Company’s stock being owned by the directors of the
insurance companies themselves (many of whom would also serve on Sanborn’s board of
directors). Through this process of enrichment, Sanborn was largely insulated from the
economic forces that impacted small firms both of the insurance and mapping variety. As
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the insurance firms allied with Sanborn became national and entered various major cities,
they introduced Sanborn’s product to local agents, creating competition. The overall
lower rates that were offered by national firms as compared to local firms triggered
additional consolidation, leading to less business for local mapping firms, which either
shuttered or were purchased by Sanborn. By the late 1890s, Hexamer who focused on
Philadelphia exclusively, was the only remaining firm in a major insurance market that
was not controlled by Sanborn. While professional organizations still posed a threat, for
the most part they were neutralized through the dominance of the national insurers who
comprised the membership of these board. Inspection bureaus, for the large part, focused
on the local and provided a different service than Sanborn. Mapping services, when
provided, became contained only to settlements too small for Sanborn to map or for
specific industrial sites such as textile mills. The exception to this, and the crux of this
chapter, is the inspection bureau which did not follow these rules on the plains of
Oklahoma. 7

As a footnote, Sanborn’s continued dominance of the field likely contributed
significantly to their decline as company in the late 1950s. The company absorbed
Hexamer due to anti-German sentiment in 1916, and crushed an upstart competitor with
a novel mapping method in 1917, and subdued a near coup from the National Board of
Fire Underwriters by adding two members to the Sanborn Map Company board of
directors in the early 1920s. After a profitable decade, the company was hurt by the Great
Depression, and it limped along through the 1940s and early 1950s and began to collapse
in the late 1950s as insurance firms consolidated and transited towards statistical methods
for estimating risk. A larger story exists about the company’s life after this period and in
its transition towards a geospatial services company, but this is beyond the scope of this
thesis.
7
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2.5

Oklahoma: Speculation and Risk on the Plains
While every state in the United States has its own unique history, the history of

Oklahoma is a microcosm of American history at large. Purchased for pennies an acre in
the Louisiana Purchase, this semi-arid “wasteland” became the home for thousands of
displaced Indigenous peoples in the 1830s. As the United States expanded, Indigenous
peoples east of the Mississippi were either pushed onto greatly reduced eastern
reservations, made to assimilate into white culture, or forced to move into “Indian
Territory” that now comprises half of modern-day Oklahoma (Chang, 2010). Marginally
protected by the federal government from white settlement and development, these
peoples were allowed to live in this foreign land as payment for the theft of their eastern
homelands.
As the Transcontinental Railroad tied the east and west coasts together, the vast
interior of the United States began to open for settlement, necessitating the removal of
additional tribes who were either forcibly removed to Indian Territory or were pushed
onto more local reservations compromised of marginal land. In this now “empty” land,
American settlers quickly moved to farms and built communities. This post-Civil War
economic development was tied together by the Homestead Act of 1862, massive
European immigration, and a rampant capitalistic system of development. In the
background the United States Public Land Survey System facilitated the white
demarcation of the land and the political guise of the Manifest Destiny pushed for the
settlement and establishment of a dozen territories and states between the end of the Civil
War in 1865 to the opening of Oklahoma and Indian Territories to white settlement in
1889.
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I argue that we can read the settlement of Oklahoma against the backdrop of the
end of the “frontier era” of American history as Turner argued in 1893. The end of this
era, is often considered the start of “formal” American imperialism outside of the
contiguous United States with the settlement of Alaska during the Klondike Gold Rush
(1896); the annexation of Hawaii (1898); the Spanish-American War and the
“protectorship” of the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico (1898); and the establishment
of Panama and the following ratification of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty which led to
the construction of the Panama Canal (1903) (McCartney, 2006). However, the long war
that the American government waged against Indigenous people increased significantly
in terms of its violence, the willful ignorance of the rule of law, and outright human
suffering in the post-Civil War period (Chun, 2013). I argue that the opening of
Oklahoma and Indian Territories to white settlement in 1889 represents a key
development in this period, as a transitional point between the end of the “Indian Wars”
and beginning of non-contiguous United States imperialism. 8
Against the backdrop of settler colonialism across the Great Plains, by the mid1880s, Oklahoma stood out as the missing puzzle piece of development. Of the six states
that adjoin Oklahoma, only New Mexico with its 34-mile-long border at the very end of
the panhandle, was not a state when Oklahoma was opened for white settlement. Yet,
modern day Oklahoma as it is now seen, was actually three separate territories by the
opening for white settlement in 1889 (Figure 2.3). Indian Territory, in the eastern half of

8 Historians continue debate when the “Indian Wars” ended, with some dates listed well into the
1920s. There also is an assimilationist rhetoric to this debate that fails to consider the ways that
Indigenous peoples continue(d) to resist settler colonialism. Regardless, the late 1880s and early
1890s represent the end of an era of overt, active, and prolonged conflict between the US Army
and Indigenous peoples.
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the state, was home to various reservations for eastern tribes. Oklahoma Territory
comprised the western half of the state, with reservations that were sparsely populated,
and a central territory known as the “Unassigned Lands” that would become a magnet for
much white colonial desire. The third territory, “No Man’s Land” was comprised of the
panhandle and was the result of various surveying decisions that left a narrow strip of
land between New Mexico, Texas, Colorado, and Kansas. Of these, Oklahoma Territory
and the Unassigned Lands in particular would become contentious issues.

Figure 2.3 Map of modern-day Oklahoma, showing the dates of various land
openings to white settlement. (Map from Oklahoma Historical Society).
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In general, these lands could not be owned by white settlers, and entry by nonindigenous peoples into the territory without explicit permission from the federal
government or individual tribes was prohibited (Chang, 2010). Without the privileges of
(white) ownership there was little outside money invested in the territories, and thus
economic growth was limited. Moreover, this form of economic development was not
part of Indigenous culture and was fundamentally different. Yet across the western
United States, capital in a variety of forms was finding new, productive outlets in
agricultural and extractive industries. As speculation subsided into the real economics of
value and profit through the production of materials in other territories, this growth
machine needed to find new outlets for expansion. Oklahoma Territory, and the
Unassigned Lands in particular, represented a seemingly open piece of land, unassigned
to any tribe, and ripe for this machine to expand to. Moreover, the borders between
Indigenous and white society were porous, with local connections across the territorial
lines and an elite Indigenous power structure in Washington, DC to deal with the federal
government. These connections would prove to be the key links in opening the territory
to white settlement.
One of these Indigenous elites, Elias Boudinot, a Cherokee, worked in
Washington, DC as a railroad promoter for the Santa Fe Railroad (Colbert, n.d.). In early
1879, he penned an article for The Chicago Times discussing the nearly two million acres
of the “Unassigned Lands” which in his opinion, were technically open to white
homesteading. The land, ceded by Creek and Seminole tribes in 1866 due to their alliance
with the Confederacy during the Civil War, returned the land to federal ownership while
adding provisions for a single north-south and east-west railroad line across the territory.
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This key change laid the foundations for the “boomer” movement, which would wage a
decade-long fight to open the Unassigned Lands to white settlement. During these
“boomer” raids, small bands of white men would cross into the territory and race to the
Unassigned Lands to claim their homestead (Hightower, 2018). Eventually, the US Army
would catch up to them, arrest them, and return them across the border. Although an
escalating series of punishments and fines sought to deter these raids, they were
ineffective. While a US District Court found that these lands were not open to
homesteading, the tribes lobbied Congress to take additional protective action, and
Indigenous peoples confronted these white invaders, boomer raids still occurred (Hoig,
n.d.).
By the mid-1880s, under the renegotiated treaties signed in 1866, the Santa Fe
Railroad began to construct a north-south railroad between Kansas and Texas which ran
right along the edge of the Unassigned Lands and Indian Territory (Hoig, n.d.). As
boomers entered the territory via the railroad and the railroad saw the opening for
increase business, Congressional lobbying increased and eventually the President was
given the authority to open the Unassigned Lands to white settlement. Finally, on April
22, 1889 at the stroke of noon, the Unassigned Lands were opened by Presidential
Proclamation for white settlement.
More than 50,000 whites streamed over the border that day (Hightower, 2018).
Acres of land that had been prairie just hours before turned into small cities that exploded
in population. Within a week, buildings had already been constructed, schools
established, banks and newspapers founded, forming a new outpost of white society. The
same process that opened the Unassigned Lands would be repeated over and over as
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various tribes had the exclusive rights to their land removed by Congress or were allowed
to engaged in Western property regimes and sell it whomever they desired. From 1889
until the Panic of 1907, Oklahoma experienced the highest population growth of any state
in the Union, more than quadrupling in population (North, 1907). Settlers flooded the
plains, turning the grasslands into "productive" homesteads in such high numbers that
more than a quarter of all Oklahoma counties reached their peak population before the
1920s (and thus before migration induced by the Dust Bowl and the Great Depression)
(US Census Bureau, 2010). 9 Oklahoma City grew at two times the rate of the second
fastest growing city in the United States, and the number of miles of railroad constructed
from 1900-1910 surpassed that of any other state (Veenendaal, Jr, n.d.). The discovery of
oil led to one of the largest economic booms, and the founding of dozens of multimillion-dollar companies engaged in the oil industry. In short, Oklahoma and Indian
Territories were booming during these years. New rounds of organized and speculative
investment sought to turn new allotments of land in the most productive economic
contributors they could be. Growth however was geographically uneven and the
speculative nature of this growth would lead to economic contraction and the collapse of
settlements.
From the geographic perspective, John Wesley Morris wrote extensively on these
topics. In the discipline historically, regional geographers have not utilized state
boundaries to define the limits of their intellectual inquiry. While a regional geographer

9 This population decline can be read as a form of speculative capitalism as measured through
population. Using demographics as a proxy for economic growth, the farther in the past the peak
population of a county was, the less economically important it is currently in relation to its past.
Additionally, this model assumes positive population growth, which has been true of Oklahoma
and the United States since its founding.
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might specialize in the American West or the Northeast, geographers have not typically
set their intellectual prowess on the activities that go on within the boundaries of an
individual state in a holistic fashion. Morris, Professor of Geography at the University of
Oklahoma from 1948 to 1973, is one of the exceptions to this rule (Goodman, 1982). As
a historical geographer, he authored more than half a dozen books on the historical
geography of Oklahoma, penning works on Oklahoma cities, boundaries, and
development. His most popular book (which remains in press today), Ghost Towns of
Oklahoma, documented the abandoned and nearly abandoned towns throughout the state,
of which he estimated there were more than 2,000 candidates (Morris, 1977). 10 Morris
identified more than a dozen reasons for the decline of towns including shifts in
agricultural patterns, changing transportation networks, political opposition, and poor
choice in townsite location. All of these factors, however, reflect the extractive nature of
the Oklahoma and Indian Territories economy, and are reflected in their fire insurance
mapping.
2.6

Insurance Mapping in Oklahoma and Indian Territories:
While the role of insurance in the early history of Oklahoma and Indian

Territories has yet to be told, from the cartographic record it is possible to reconstruct
where and when white insurers began to see these territories as profitable. By the mid1880s, Sanborn was well on its way to becoming the preeminent fire insurance mapping
company in the United States. In 1886 Sanborn mapped McAlester and Muskogee, and in

10 In order for a town to count as a ghost town, Morris had three main criteria for inclusion on
the list: 1) all building in the settlement were no longer standing, or 2) very few buildings remain
and were largely abandoned, or 3) for larger towns, there had been a decrease in 80% in
population from its highest figure. Morris noted this could include towns of as small as a few
dozen people to small cities of a few thousand.
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1888 returned to map Vinita and Wewoka. These towns, centers for the meeting of white
commerce and industry with Indigenous peoples for their respective nations (Choctaw,
Muscogee, Cherokee, and Seminole), were mapped on a single sheet each. Clearly, there
was not much in the eyes of the surveyor worth insuring likely due to the fact that
Indigenous settlement patterns did not reflect those of white Americans. Apart from these
towns, it would not be until 1894 that Sanborn would return to Oklahoma to issue new
maps. 11 Mapping sixty-four towns in that year, Sanborn’s production in this state would
be extremely high as the company sought to provide its clients with the necessary
information to begin underwriting. This reentry into mapping the territories is likely
reflected that stabilization of the market from 1893 to 1896. Across the United States
economic growth was highly uneven, with multiple small financial panics occurring
(Hoffmann, 1956). Seeing that the Oklahoma and Indian Territory market did not
decrease significantly during this period likely showed insurers that the market had, at a
minimum, stabilized (Figure 2.4).

11 It is important to note here that it is possible for Sanborn to have mapped additional towns
and/or revisited the territories before this time. With the sole source of evidence coming from the
copyright deposits of Sanborn maps in the Library of Congress, it is possible there are
undocumented editions of maps that were published and are unknown.
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Value of Underwritten Risk, 1888-1899
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Figure 2.4 Value of Underwritten Risk for Oklahoma and Indian Territories and
the state of Utah from 1888-1889. Data was collected from The Weekly Underwriter,
a trade publication for the insurance industry, from the December edition for the
years 1888-1899.

Moreover, in comparison to the state of Utah, which in 1890 had a population of
roughly 50,000 fewer people than the combined population of Oklahoma and Indian
Territories, the market was primed for more growth. The value of underwritten risk in
Utah in 1890 was nearly four times the size of the Oklahoma and Indian Territories
market, indicating that the territories underinsured. When comparing overall map
production between the combined territories, Utah, and Oregon (which had a population
roughly 60,000 people larger than the combined territories), we see the explosion of the
Oklahoma and Indian Territories market, with map production from 1894 to 1899
outpacing Utah and Oregon’s combined total mapping for the entire sixteen year period
from 1884 to 1899 (251 maps for Oklahoma and Indian Territories to 232 maps for Utah
and Oregon combined, see Figure 2.5).
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Sanborn Map Production, 1884-1899
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Figure 2.5 Sanborn Map production for Oklahoma & Indian Territories, Utah, and
Oregon. These areas, all with similar populations, show the variability in mapping
by Sanborn. (Data from University of California, Berkeley Union List).

This sustained growth is reflective of the various forms of speculative capital that
was flowing into the territories during this time. From the insurance perspective, a
combination of eastern, midwestern, and international insurers were underwriting
Oklahoma and Indian Territory’s sustained growth which expanded (in terms of dollars
underwritten) more than sevenfold between 1892 and 1899 (Table 2.1).
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Table 2.1 Geographic Location of Oklahoma and Indian Territory Underwriters.
Note the nearly eight-fold increase in value underwritten between 1892 and 1899.
(Data from The Weekly Underwriter.)
1892 Amount Underwritten by
1899 Amount Underwritten by Region
Region
Sum of
Sum of
Region
State/Country Total Risk
Row Labels
Total Risk
East
Connecticut
4699190
East
3260020
New Jersey
1097149
Connecticut
673657
New York
6874579
Massachusetts 385662
Pennsylvania
3016914
New Jersey
158177
Rhode Island
174261
New York
1368367
Virginia
9723
Pennsylvania
674157
Massachusetts 2014451
International
847857
East Total
17886267
Canada
19675
International Canada
717354
Germany
1750
United
Germany
292740
Kingdom
826432
Netherlands
94982
Midwest
254610
Sweden
12100
Illinois
58180
Switzerland
32550
Minnesota
196430
United
Kingdom
5250571
Grand Total
4362487
International Total
6400297
Midwest
Illinois
237560
Kansas
2156724
Minnesota
1107817
Missouri
939302
Wisconsin
284017
Midwest Total
4725420
Grand Total
29011984

Here the expansion in amount of value underwritten and the geographic expanse
of the underwriters themselves signified the growth in the value of Oklahoma. Another
way in which to visualize this growth is through the meta-mapping method, documenting
the number of maps produced per county in Oklahoma. The spatial differences indicate
the general location (albeit delayed due to the process of actually issuing maps after
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surveying) of where value was being created in Oklahoma (Figure 2.6). For example,
1894 shows a nearly bifurcated split between new opened Oklahoma Territory and Indian
Territory. In 1895, this progressed to just mapping the northern part of Oklahoma
Territory and in 1896, southern Oklahoma Territory and all of Indian Territory. These
spatial variations reflect not only the growth of economic value of individual counties,
but also the ways in which the Sanborn Map Company organized its mapping efforts.

Figure 2.6 Number of Sanborn Maps Issued per County in Oklahoma, 1894 to 1905.
Note that several counties were not mapped during this time period. (Data from
University of California, Berkeley Union List).

In short, the booming economic profile of Oklahoma and Indian Territories
resulted in a tremendous growth in the amount and value of underwritten risk. From an
underwriting perspective, this meant that there was a need to understand the conditions of
the built environment in Oklahoma and Indian Territories. Sanborn’s role in this market
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would not emerge in earnest until 1894, yet the company would soon be challenged by a
new competitor: the Clarkson Inspection Bureau.
2.7

The Upstart Competitor: The Clarkson Inspection Bureau
The Clarkson Inspection Bureau is emblematic of inspection bureaus insomuch as

it is one of the few whose history can be traced by its notoriety as well as its historical
record. As previously discussed, inspection bureaus worked as local information brokers
for the insurance industry, providing in-depth local knowledge to insurers and advocacy
for more favorable insurance laws at the local level. While many were industry
associations or non-profits, a few were individually owned and run, turning a profit based
on how accurate and up to date their information was. The Clarkson Inspection Bureau
falls in the latter category and used its influence to swindle many a policyholder into
paying higher rates to line the pockets of insurers.
The namesake of the company, Harrison Clarkson, was born in 1833 in Indiana
and started his career in the insurance industry in 1864 as a field agent for the Aetna
Insurance Company (coincidently the first client of the Sanborn Map Company). In 1868,
Aetna sent him to Kansas on a work trip and he and his young family soon relocated to
Topeka (State Archives, n.d.). As time went on he became more prominent in the
insurance community, eventually being appointed to serve as the deputy state
Superintendent of Insurance in 1871 before being promoted to full Superintendent in
1874 where he served for the legal limit of one year (Topeka Capital, 1905). After his
tenure, he became deeply involved with the Kansas Inspection Bureau in Topeka and
during the 1880s, he became associated with the Rocky Mountain Inspection Bureau
based out of Denver. Also during this time, he began a publishing company that
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exclusively produced products for the insurance industry. His control over both the
information brokers of the insurance industry and the means of publication placed him in
an excellent position to exert control within the Kansas insurance industry.
For example, one of the products he offered was the Harrison Clarkson Insurance
Rate Book, a guide that assisted Kansas insurance agents in setting rates throughout the
entire state. This guide became so widespread in insurance underwriting that in 1897 the
state of Kansas brought Clarkson and nearly 60 insurance companies to court for
violating the state's anti-trust laws (Grant, 1979). The state's argument was that Clarkson
was not actually running an independent inspection company at all, but rather was a
middleman colluding with insurers to fix artificially high rates across the state. In return
for these higher rates, Clarkson allegedly received kickbacks while the insurance
companies reaped extra profit. While both Clarkson and the insurance companies sought
to have the case dismissed, the parties eventually acquiesced, and Clarkson's Rating
Bureau ceased to do business—or so wrote the insurance commissioner in 1897 (Kansas
Insurance Department, 1898).
Contemporary records indicate that Clarkson did not abolish his rating bureau and
publishing house but rather continued the business (Oklahoma and Indian Territories
Inspection Bureau, 1905). While subsequent Superintendents of Insurance would
investigate the company, none would end up taking them down. Clarkson and the
insurance companies had plenty to lose and in classic business form doubled-down on
diversification. Already somewhat present in the insurance markets in Oklahoma and
Indian Territories, in July of 1899 they began to issue different rates for each territory.
The by-product of this control was likely higher insurance rates for residents of the two
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territories. Indeed, during the 1904 meeting of attorneys for Oklahoma and Indian
Territories, the association spent time discussing the state of fire insurance in the
territories. They stated that there was a need for:
“creating a board, or a fire insurance commission with power to
determine what companies may do business in the territory and to fix and
regulate insurance rates in the various localities. All fire insurance rates in
Oklahoma are now fixed by one insurance expert in Topeka, Kansas, and
no person, board or authority in Oklahoma has any authority or power in
the matter, except to pay full tariff rates or “kick” or both.”
--Oklahoma and Indian Territory Bar Association, 1904, 70-71
With the understanding of this issue, it is unclear what action—if any—was taken
legally. However, around 1905 the name was changed from Clarkson Rating Bureau to
the Oklahoma and Indian Territory Inspection Bureau, though it seems that the
publishing of rates was controlled by Clarkson in Topeka for some additional years. 12
Regardless, the inspection bureau remained in business until the mid-1950s. As part of a
broader consolidation of inspection bureaus , the former records were likely destined for
the landfill until they were rescued by the former head statistician for the rating bureau
and donated to the Oklahoma Historical Society in Oklahoma City. 13 The collection
contains no correspondence but is comprised of fire rating booklets, Sanborn fire
insurance maps updated by hand, and manuscript fire insurance maps created under the
Clarkson moniker. These look to be the primary documents used by the Clarkson Rating
Bureau during the late 19th and early 20th centuries and provide insight into insurance
operations in Oklahoma and Indian Territories. The uniqueness of this collection is the
12 Clarkson seems to have found the insurance mapping business lucrative as he operated under a
variety names in a much-reduced role in Kansas until his death in 1921.
13 Another topic beyond the scope of this thesis is the consolidation of local inspection bureaus
from the 1950s to the late 1970s, and the emergence of a national inspection bureau named
“Insurance Service Organization” which is now a division of Verisk.

52

large number of manuscript fire insurance maps, which together comprise over a
thousand maps, many of which are unique for their depictions of the Oklahoma built
environment.
This trove of cartographic materials indicates that Clarkson was competing with
Sanborn in mapping risk in Oklahoma and Indian Territories. Many towns were mapped
by both Sanborn and Clarkson in the same year, often within months of each other,
indicating that the two firms sough to be able to provide the most up-to-date geographic
information. While production of Clarkson maps began as early as 1892, by the turn of
the twentieth century, Clarkson was well on its way to rivaling Sanborn in terms of the
number of towns mapped in Oklahoma (Figure 2.7). 14

14 It is highly possible that the archive is incomplete, thus Clarkson may have been more active
earlier.
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Figure 2.7 Clarkson and Sanborn map production, 1892-1915. Clarkson Data from
the Oklahoma Historical Society, Sanborn from University of California, Berkeley
Union List

Production of Clarkson maps increased steadily throughout the late 1890s,
outpacing Sanborn’s production in 1900, 1902, 1903, 1905, 1906, and 1907, before
steadily declining into the 1910s. Yet, while production outpaced Sanborn, the number of
sheets per settlement was significantly lower overall (Figure 2.8). As a metric of
economic worth, the number of pages per settlement is one possible proxy from which to
understand the overall production of these maps. Since the normal scale of Sanborn maps
were fifty feet to one inch (1:600) and Clarkson maps were roughly at the same scale,
contextualizing the number of sheets per town on average shows how much land each
company was mapping. Since underwriters wanted as much information as possible to
accurately assess risk and to expand their portfolios, a smaller average number of sheets
indicates an emphasis on smaller, less economically important towns while a higher
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average number of sheets indicates the opposite. This metric provides one view on
understanding the portfolio of maps produced by each company.
Average Number of Sheets per Town Mapped, 1892-1920
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Figure 2.8 Average number of sheets per town mapped, 1892-1920. Clarkson Data
from the Oklahoma Historical Society, Sanborn from University of California,
Berkeley Union List

From 1892 to 1900, Sanborn and Clarkson’s average sheets per town was
relatively similar, yet as the low count of map production as Figure 2.8 shows, production
was dominated mainly by Sanborn after 1900. Here the company began an effort to map
relevant settlements in Oklahoma. Yet even when Clarkson’s map production increased
from 1900 to 1906, there was little variability in the average number of sheets produced
per town by Clarkson. This suggests that Clarkson was mapping less area than Sanborn.
The spike in average Sanborn map production in 1906 reflects the company’s remapping
of Oklahoma City (101 sheets) and the mapping of three small towns which has an
55

impact on the average. Even removing this large spike, it is clear that Sanborn was
mapping larger towns with more frequency than Clarkson was during this time.
Contextualizing Sanborn production within Oklahoma and Indian Territories to
other states is another way in which to understand the speculative nature of the insurance
enterprise. When comparing the average number of sheets per town in the territories to
that of Pennsylvania (Figure 2.9) it is clear that Sanborn was producing far fewer sheets
per town in Oklahoma than it was other states. This likely was reflective of Sanborn’s
approach to mapping Oklahoma towns, which prioritized the number of individual towns
mapped over the comprehensiveness of maps themselves. In other words, Sanborn issued
more individual maps of towns with a smaller sheet count than they did in other states.
This issue reflects a long-standing question regarding Sanborn map production; mainly
around the extent to which a settlement’s “suburbs” were mapped. Understanding that
cities did not have definitive borders where the built environment ended, individual
surveyors were left to assess whether these suburban zones were worth the cost of
mapping. In Oklahoma, these areas were likely not deemed economically valuable
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enough to be mapped.
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Figure 2.9 Average number of sheets per town mapped, 1886-1920. Sanborn data
from University of California, Berkeley Union List.

The large spike in average sheets per settlement in Pennsylvania from 1916 to
1920 reflects Sanborn’s acquisition of the Hexamer Map Company in the leadup to the
First World War (Ristow, 1968). Sanborn quickly began to reissue these maps under their
own imprint, utilizing Hexamer’s underlying system to divide the city. Hexamer had
utilized the same scale, however narrowed the extent of each individual sheet, which
produced more map sheets and a greater number of overall volumes. Since Sanborn
adopted this system, the average from 1916 on for Pennsylvania is inflated. Even when
taking this into consideration, the overall average production is higher than Oklahoma.
This suggests that interest from insurers was strong enough to continue surveying small
Oklahoma towns, many under five sheets for over two decades.
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Insurers willingness to purchase new maps undergirded the entire production of
Sanborn maps. Indeed, as the following letter to an insurance agent in late 1904 shows,
an affirmative to purchase maps led the publication of a map. Surveyor Harry W. Randall
wrote to two insurers:
“Kindly advise me of your write [sic] insurance in any of the following
towns: Enterprise, Whitefield, Stigler, Vian or Canadian. What companies
do you place this outside business in?” (Randall, 1904)
With what must have been a positive response, Randall visited all five towns located in
Indian Territory, mapping them in November 1904. At the time the towns all had a
population of around 500 people or less and all had been surveyed before. As Figure 2.10
shows, these were not substantial settlements, rather they were small rural gathering
points frequently built around the railroad or the cotton gin where farmers would
frequent. From the perspective of distant insurers, these were settlements that could grow
rapidly depending on the local economic conditions and the assistive hand of speculative
capital. In other words, what might be a small town built around a cotton gin, might in a
year or two, become a sizable town with the introduction of a railroad or the discovery of
a new mineral resource to exploit. Insurers would thus want this information to ensure
that they had an understanding of the local built environment and a foothold in what
might be an emerging market. Indeed, Clarkson would also find some of these same
towns profitable for their map offerings, producing maps of Canadian (1902, two
editions), Vian (1906, two editions), and Stigler (1904 and an unknown date).
Interestingly, the 1904 Clarkson map of Stigler was also provided in November, perhaps
indicating copying or “double-dipping” on the part of the surveyor, similar to Scarlett &
Scarlett in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.
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Figure 2.10 Whitefield, Choctaw Nation, February 1899. These spontaneous
settlements were highly unplanned, reflecting their provisional nature. (Geography
and Maps Division, Library of Congress).
For Sanborn, however, 1904 would be the last mapping for Enterprise and
Whitefield. Canadian would be mapped an additional time in 1914 and Vian three more
times until 1927. Only Stigler, made the county seat of Pittsburg County in 1907, would
eventually grow larger than two sheets, last mapped in 1931 with seven sheets. As
underwriters found these areas to be unprofitable, the towns were dropped from
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Sanborn’s offerings, reflecting their diminished economic importance. Based on the low
average number of maps produced per town, Sanborn was carrying a large profile of
these smaller settlements, some of which grew tremendously and others that faded into
oblivion.
Perhaps nothing illuminates the role of speculative capitalism than the more than
ten "one-and-done" towns that were never remapped again by Sanborn from 1894-1915,
and the over fifteen that were revisited and resurveyed only once. These towns, some of
which today are ghost towns and many of which are documented in Morris’s Ghost
Towns of Oklahoma, reflect the overactive hand of the insurance market (Morris, 1977).
At the same time, some towns grew so significantly that insurance mapping by Sanborn
could not keep up: this is where Clarkson stepped in.
For example, Bartlesville located in eastern Oklahoma, is a prime example of this.
A small village first settled in 1895, Bartlesville was incorporated in 1897 as "third class"
town with a population of under two-hundred people. Noting oil slicks on the surface of a
nearby creek, a local merchant began drilling on land located outside of town. Striking
black gold, the 21-day gushing of the Nellie Johnstone Well No.1 made public the
knowledge that the area was home to a significant reserve of oil. Sensing immense
economic potential, the Santa Fe railroad came to the town in 1899 setting off a
tremendous economic boom (May, n.d.). Companies including Phillips Petroleum of
Phillips 66 fame, Getty Oil, Citgo, and Sinclair all got their start in the oil fields around
Bartlesville. This subsequent economic boom can be traced on the interplay between
maps produced Clarkson and Sanborn maps updated by Clarkson located in the
Oklahoma Historical Society.
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The town was first mapped by Clarkson in April 1900 where it had a recorded
population of 800 people. Clarkson updated its own maps with corrections and additional
sheets in 1903 and 1905, for a total of 5 sheets. By 1904, Sanborn had published a map
stating the population was 1,500 people, which Clarkson corrected on its own in 1905
and 1907, while adding an additional map sheet in 1906 bringing the total to 3 sheets.
Sanborn again resurveyed in July 1907, publishing 7 sheets, though Clarkson did
not update this map likely due to the Panic of 1907 (which severely dampened economic
growth nationwide) and the fact that in November of 1909 Sanborn again published a
new map totaling 15 sheets. Clarkson would update this 1909 map by hand until 1915.
From April 1900 to November 1909, the population of this town grew from only 800
people to 10,000. Though the 1910 Census would record the population just over 6,500
people, it is clear that Bartlesville was developing faster than Sanborn could keep up or
was willing to do.
As oil emerged as a key industry in Oklahoma, Clarkson continued to produce
maps documenting the risks in oil fields, refineries, and storage facilities. These maps
reflect the highly specialized nature of these entities and the immense capital that
undergirded them. Here a much smaller, more specialized corps of surveyors documented
various risks in these high-value industrial plans. In Oklahoma, Clarkson stepped in to fill
this role, documenting various oil industry facilities, allowing Sanborn to map towns as it
did across the nation.
2.8

Variations in the Underwriting Process
As insurance developed in Oklahoma and Indian Territories, there was an unequal

application of fire insurance rates between the two territories. While fire insurance maps
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were produced to roughly the same standards across the United States the map was only
one tool in the determination of fire insurance rates. A complex assemblage of
information went into the determination of the final amount of risk and the overall
premium for the property, including not only the depiction of the built environment as
shown on the map, but also the agent’s personal knowledge of the area and the client, the
rules issued by corporate headquarters, and the guidance issued by the local inspection
bureau (Baranoff, 1998).
To illustrate the complex dynamics of this process, I want to use the town of
Addington, Indian Territory, located in the territory assigned to the Chickasaw Nation.
While not significant, the town highlights how this the underwriting process occurred and
tied remote settlements into a white, Western economic order.
In March of 1904, Addington was mapped by both Sanborn and Clarkson. The
town had a population of around 500 people, with no firefighting equipment, no
substantial civic improvements, and a rudimentary water system. The local industry was
centered around the Chicago, Rock Island, and Pacific Railroad and consisted of resource
extraction and processing, thus the industrial landscape consisted of feed lots, lumber
yards, grain storage facilities, and a brick factory (Sanborn Map Company, 1904).
Interspersed in this landscape were homes, commercial facilities, and service industries.
It was an otherwise unremarkable town. The 1904 Sanborn map is only a single sheet and
documents the town near its peak population. 15

15 Morris lists Addington as a ghost town, currently the town has a population of around 100
inhabitants (Morris, 1977).
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Figure 2.11 Sanborn Map for Addington, Indian Territory, 1904 (Geography &
Maps Division, Library of Congress). Key: Vac. = Vacant, Off. = Office, Gen’l S. =
General Store, D.G. = Druggist, Gro. = Grocer, P.O. = Post Office, D = Dwelling.
Numbers in the street indicate address, those such as “ 20‘ “ indicate the width of
the street, numbers within lots indicate lot number as surveyed for deeds, within a
building this corresponds to the number of floors. For more information see
(Sanborn Map Company, 1953).

For the purpose of this example, assume that as an underwriter you have received
an application for a policy on building located at 121-122 Second Street, comprised of a
tin shop, a hardware store, and a furrier/undertaker business (Figure 2.11). Given the mix
of open flame from the tin shop, the abundance of flammable materials likely contained
in the hardware store, and the explosive chemicals needed for being a furrier and
undertaker—all contained within a wood building in a town without firefighters or a
steady water supply—an insurer would be unlikely to underwrite such a dangerous
building. Assuming that perhaps the insurer knew the owner and felt obligated to
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underwrite a policy, the underwriter would need to take into the account both the
conditions of town and the building itself (as previously described) and also the
immediate landscape. The entire block was built of wooden-frame dwellings (all highly
flammable), contained three drug stores and two general stores (likely containing
flammable materials), one vacant building (unmonitored and thus a liability risk), and one
dwelling (a source of near constant fire from the kitchen). This would have raised the
insurance premium needed to insure this building significantly.
On top of this, the underwriter would have to follow company policy as well.
Insurers would regularly deny writing new policies based on the amount of risk they had
already underwritten—i.e. if the general store at 123 Second Street was insured through
the same firm, 121-122 Second Street would be unlikely to receive a policy. Moreover,
some insurance companies set their own rates to ensure that they would turn a profit on
insuring certain types of industry. Here, the furrier/undertaker business would likely have
their own rate as determined by the company’s head office, that was applied to all such
risky businesses across the nation.
Finally, the underwriter could turn to the rate book issued by the local inspection
agency. Here the 1905 rate book—issued by Harrison Clarkson in Kansas City—guided
the minimum rates to charge (Oklahoma and Indian Territories Inspection Bureau, 1905).
Given that 121-122 Second Street was one building with three businesses in it, plus an
additional store was located within 25 feet (123 Second Street), 121-122 itself would be
assessed at $6.80 and the contents within at an additional $6.25 per month at a minimum.
Given the particulars of Addington and the composition of the businesses within the
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building, the rate would have likely needed to be much higher to compensate for the
additional risk.
In the setting of rates, biases could easily be introduced. Sanborn maps were
known note the denomination of places of worship, which given the location of places of
worship in this time period, served as an indicator of the ethnic composition of the
immediate community (Hillier, 2010). For some places of worship, especially those for
specific communities, the name revealed detailed information about the local occupants
(i.e. African Methodist Episcopal, Greek Orthodox, Jewish, etc). This trend continued in
Oklahoma, however other markers influenced the writing of policies, specifically based
on territory.
Oklahoma and Indian Territories were separate political entities and the rating
structure commissioned by Clarkson privileged the mainly white residents of Oklahoma
Territory over the demographics of Indian Territory. For example, if Addington was
located in Oklahoma Territory instead of Indian Territory in 1905, 121-122 Second Street
would have had a minimum policy of $4.60 for the building and $4.25 for the contents
(Oklahoma and Indian Territories Inspection Bureau, 1905). In general, insurance rates
for buildings in Oklahoma Territory were about 30% lower than they were for buildings
in Indian Territory. While the archival record does not document the precise reasons for
these discrepancies, given the racial discrimination exhibited towards the inhabitants of
Indian Territory and the variations in economic development between the two territories,
race seems to be a likely explanation for these differences. Moreover, insurance redlining
has a long history in the United States, locking minorities out of the benefits of insurance
and increasing the negative risks that the lack of insurance brings (Squires, 2003). Thus, a
65

structural aspect of insurance regimes in Oklahoma was tilted towards discriminating
towards minority groups under the guise of them providing inherently higher risk.
The accuracy of insurance maps was critical to the efficient functioning of the
underwriting system. Sanborn innovated a system of updating maps via “corrections”
which allowed the original map to be updated by pasting on updates to the map
(Hayward, 1973). In Oklahoma and Indian Territories, the rapid pace of development
meant that new maps and paste-ons needed to be issued on a regular basis. Very few of
these paste-on maps exist for Sanborn maps; Clarkson maps have many preserved,
updated maps. The two following images demonstrate how Sanborn and Clarkson
depicted a block in Norman, Oklahoma Territory.
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Figure 2.12 Norman, OK August 1898 (Geography & Maps Division, Library of
Congress).

Figure 2.13 Clarkson Map, Norman OK June 1898, updated to November 1899 in
pencil (Oklahoma Historical Society)

In Figure 2.12, produced by Sanborn, we see a standardized set of abbreviations
that classified land use across the United States, while Figure 2.13 shows the different set
used by Clarkson. The maps are nearly identical in terms of depictions of the built
environment, however with the later date of survey we see some of the changes that
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occurred in just two months’ time. For example, 294 Main is shown on the Clarkson map
as a hotel, in the Sanborn its listed as vacant. 286 Main is listed as a wagon shop in the
Clarkson map, and as a blacksmith on the Sanborn map. 291 is vacant on the Clarkson
map and is listed as a soda factory on the Sanborn. These differences in representation on
the map would lead to differing levels of risk, corresponding to differing premiums for
the occupants of this part of town. The difference between the Clarkson and Sanborn map
is as much of a product of the rapid change in the landscape of Oklahoma and Indian
Territories as it reflective of the surveyor’s method of recording the landscape. In other
words, the subjectivity of the map was a valuable tool for underwriters to understand the
variegated and varied landscape of these urban environments.
2.9

Conclusion
Ultimately the missions of these two companies explain the differences in their

maps: Clarkson made its money selling up-to-date local insurance information to other
insurance companies, while Sanborn was at its core a mapping business with a national
clientele. Clarkson made its money on having a wealth of knowledge of the local
conditions, Sanborn made its money on selling highly accurate maps to large clients. And
although it is difficult to classify this as a true rivalry, there are clues that Sanborn
responded to the declining number and increased specificity of Clarkson maps in the
spirit of traditional inspection bureaus after 1911. From 1916 to 1920, the number of
"one-and-done" towns that Sanborn never returned to map due to their relative
unimportance increased significantly, and a column-long article in a company newsletter
from 1925 noted the past mutual distrust and conflict between the state bureaus such as
Clarkson and the Sanborn Map Company (Kelly, 1925).
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With an absence of textual company archives for both Sanborn and Clarkson,
understanding if this was a true rivalry, an uneasy alliance, or just a plain historical
coincidence may never fully be known. However, in the spirit of contextualizing the
development of Oklahoma's early insurance markets and the broader history of the
Sanborn Map Company, this analysis highlights the ways in which the dynamics of the
economic cycle, insurance markets, and mapping companies responded to the meet the
needs of customers. In analyzing the records of the Clarkson Rating Bureau, it seems as if
the immense amount of cartographic material can be attributed to Sanborn's hesitation to
map and resurvey the area regularly, the increasing scrutiny within Kansas towards
Clarkson's practices, and the natural market for up-to-date information about the built
environment in two rapidly changing and economically dynamic territories.
While the historical geography literature has frequently utilized Sanborn Maps as
a tool to understand the historical built environment, this literature has largely ignored the
role of insurance and the role of these maps in the formation of this environment.
Through an analysis of the formation of an insurance market during the peak period of
settler-colonial state development, this chapter illuminates how the management of risk
was critical to the continuance of economic development. These linkages point to a need
for a more nuanced understanding of the geographic perspective of insurance, some of
which is being researched in this current moment. Emerging literature between naturesociety and economic geography has begun to question the connection between climate
change and insurance, examining how disasters are being quantified and monetized to
maintain the status quo (Booth, 2020). While the onus of this research is different, the
fundamental question of the geographies of risk remains the same. Understanding the
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spatial mechanics behind risk is crucial to understanding both historical issues such as the
development of the built environment and contemporary issues such as the impacts of
climate change on human settlements (Gibson-Graham et al., 2019). The meeting point
for these forms of scholarship revolves around the utility of geographic information in a
corporate setting, where information is analyzed, and decisions are made which
ultimately come to bear on the landscape. As Chapter 3 shows, these decisions are not
just limited to the world of insurance but are located throughout much of corporate
America.
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CHAPTER 3. THE BUSINESS OF GEOGRAPHY: WILLIAM APPLEBAUM, SITE-SELECTION,
AND ECONOMIC VALUE OF GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
3.1

Introduction
In conducting a literature review for the second chapter of this thesis, I came

across a strange, short article in the journal Economic Geography. Published in 1952 and
entitled A Technique for Constructing a Population and Urban Land Use Map*, this
four-page article detailed the use of Sanborn maps in determining where a population
lived and the state of the built environment (Applebaum, 1952). The contents of the paper
were routine, and this was not what attracted my attention. Rather, it was the byline of the
article’s author and the small asterisk at the end of the title which drew immediate
question. Firstly, the author, William Applebaum, was listed as the Assistant General
Manager of Stop & Shop, Inc (a Boston-based supermarket chain) with the caveat that he
had “pioneered … marketing geography.” Secondly, the asterisk linked to a short
footnote at that bottom of the page which stated “This paper, given originally before the
Association of American Geographer in December 1935, has been revised and brought
up to date to meet a continuing interest in the subject” (Applebaum, 1952). Between the
nearly seventeen years between presenting and publishing the work, and the nonacademic status of Applebaum, I became intrigued that there was more to this paper and
author. What I found and what this chapter is, is a biography of a geographer whose
influence on the discipline of geography and the American built environment has been
perhaps forgotten.
In the context of the history of geography, much work needs to be done to uplift
the voices of the marginalized actors who played critical roles in the structure of the
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discipline. To this end, Applebaum fills this role as a professional geographer of Jewish
descent who did not complete graduate work, yet would go onto to receive the
Association of American Geographer’s highest award in 1959 (American Association of
Geographers, n.d.). He remains in the shadows of the discipline, yet his work in
pioneering the ideas of site selection and market trading areas remains of key importance
to the formation of the American built environment.
As Chapter 2 showed, there is an economy to the production, circulation, and use
of maps. While often wrapped up in the social and the political, the creation of maps to
marshal resources and document the emergence of risk, exists as a form value creation
for map readers. This chapter takes a different tack on the examination of the economic
value of geographic information. Through a lens of Applebaum, I explore the use of
geographic information in business and its connections to geographic scholarship. While
economic geography exists as a subdiscipline, much of its work is focused on the
economies of space and the organization of society to produce value. In these regimes of
scholarship, there has been little attention paid to the role of geographic information and
business decision making. Much of this form of analysis is materialized in the realm of
applied and business geographies. Here geographic information is at the core of these
enterprises; situating them historically allows us to understand their overall importance
and their impact upon the discipline (Wood and Phelps, 2020).
3.2

William Applebaum: Becoming a Geographer
Born in 1906 in Pruzhany, Belarus, Applebaum’s family immigrated to the United

States in 1920. His parents initially settled in Spokane before moving to St. Paul,
Minnesota in high school. Fluent in three languages by the time he graduated (English,
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Russian, and German), he enrolled in the University of Minnesota in 1925 intending to
study medicine (Harvard University, 2005, 10-12). After a difficult year, he withdrew and
spent a year working as a ranch hand in the upper Midwest. Determined to complete a
degree, he returned to Minnesota in 1928, declaring a major in geography. Here
Applebaum would excel academically and make a number of important connections
before graduating in 1931.

Figure 3.1 William Applebaum, circa 1964. (Harvard Business School Archives,
Faculty Biographical Information, William Applebaum, Carton 1, Folder GC 151).

His most important connection was with a relatively new figure on campus, a
young professor by the of Richard Hartshorne. Hartshorne, then just a few years removed
from completing his PhD at the University of Chicago in 1924, had taken up a position
teaching geography at Minnesota. Though the department was comprised primarily of
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older geographers with little cohesion, Hartshorne found his Minnesota environment to
be a productive base from which to establish a career (DeVivo, 2015). An impressive
scholarly output—nearly an article a year in an era where an article every few years was
sufficient for tenure—and the beginning of the development of an international network
of geographers were hallmarks of Hartshorne’s research agenda in these years. Long
before Hartshorne’s turn towards political geography in the mid-1930s and publication of
The Nature of Geography in 1939, these efforts were aimed towards exploring topics
related towards economic and urban geography. His PhD dissertation at Chicago led to
early publications on grain movement on Lake Michigan (1924) and studies in a similar
vein were conducted on the location iron and steel production (1928). And in a glance of
what was to come, Hartshorne also penned a semi-theoretical article entitled Location as
a Factor in Geography (Hartshorne, 1927), arguing that the location of various entities in
space may not reflect the “optimum location” for the best efficiency. In the late 1920s, as
geography slowly began to throw off the yoke of environmental determinism, these early
efforts at articulating a distinctly urban and distinctly economic geography, were key in
moving the discipline forward.
Hartshorne’s movement towards these distinct fields seems to have culminated as
Applebaum was finishing his degree, which examined the urban economic geography of
the Twin Cities (Hartshorne, 1932). Though heavily regionalistic, Appelbaum, who likely
took classes with Hartshorne, would have been readily exposed to many of these ideas
throughout his undergraduate education. From Applebaum’s future career, it is clear that
these interests in urban and economic geography resonated with him. Graduating in the
depths of the Great Depression, he was fortunate to earn a fellowship to start his graduate
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education at the University of Cincinnati. Enrolling in the fall of 1931, Applebaum
undertook an immense project in urban and economic geography that would yield a twovolume report by the end of his nine-month fellowship but no graduate degree.
3.3

Nevin Fenneman, the University of Cincinnati, and Early Applied Economic
Geography
Like many other departments during this era, the geography department at the

University of Cincinnati was combined with the geology department. Under the
leadership of Nevin M. Fenneman, a geologist turned geographer and a founding member
of the Association of American Geographers, the department had carved out a research
niche in physical geography but little in the realm of human geography, mirroring
Fenneman’s own research interests. In some sense, Fenneman was a less famous version
of William Morris Davis. Trained at the University of Chicago with Rollin Salisbury, his
research focused on the physiography of the United States. Similar to Salisbury, he
believed that “Geology deals with the history of the earth’s crust. Physiography deals
with the history of the earth’s surface.” (UA-81-35, Box 3, Unpublished Papers and
Address, 1914 AAG Paper). In addition to being a founding member of the Association
of American Geographers, his major research contribution to geography was the twovolume physiography of the United States (Fenneman, 1938a, 1938b). He oversaw the
1918 Association of American Geographers conference held in conjunction with the
Geological Society of America, where he also was a member of the leadership (Ryan,
1986). And although an important figure in the formation of geography, Fenneman was
fundamentally a geologist at heart. This importantly shaped his understanding of how
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geography as a discipline should function and what role the geographer should play in
society.
Fenneman saw the work of the geographer as similar to the work of the geologist:
while there was much scientific research to conduct, much of that work could be tied to
commercial and practical ends. If geologists could find employ in the academy, private
industry, and in government, something Fenneman did throughout his career, so too
could geographers. From his perspective, geography’s greatest utility was to align
research interests with the practical goals of society. While Fennemen’s work general
revolved around his geological training, the commercial applications of geographic
thinking were an important part of his research. In the 1910s, Fennemen vigorously but
unsuccessfully argued for the location of a new Federal Reserve Bank branch in
Cincinnati over Cleveland stating that Cincinnati’s geographic distribution of trade was
larger than Cleveland’s (Ryan, 1986).
His interest in the practical applications of geography as a mode of operations for
the discipline seems to have been of significant focus to him from around the First World
War until the mid-1920s. His 1918 Presidential Address at the Annual Meeting of the
Association of American Geographers sought to expand on this topic, in a defense of the
relevance of the discipline (Fenneman, 1919). Similar to recent debates about the core of
the discipline, Fennemen sought to articulate the importance of geography as unifying
science that could synthesize multiple disciplines into a single narrative. This narrative,
and the emphasis of his speech, was on the importance of areal relations and regional
geography to the contribution of scientific knowledge. As he noted, the significant
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number of geographers involved in the First World War indicated a utility to society that
the geographer was able to fulfill.
At the 1920 American Geographical Society meeting in New York, Fenneman
presented a paper entitled Geographic Adjustment as a Line of Research, detailing how
geographers could use the geographic lens to “adjust” human life to be more efficient.
Rooted in deterministic thinking, the onus of Fenneman’s paper was on geography’s role
making society more efficient, centering on the relationship between the physical
environment and various facets of human geography such as agriculture, transportation,
commerce, and industry. To typify the types of questions a geographer could ask,
Fenneman posed the following questions:
“Is the state industrially adjusted? Is it availing itself of its raw material?
Are the proper industries based on these; and are they properly located? Is
it overdoing any of these? Is account being taken of the fact that
neighboring states can do some of these things better? Are two related
industries so located and operated as to strengthen and not weaken each
other?”
–(1920: UA-81-35, Box 3, Unpublished Addresses and Papers)
These questions centered the onus of research on economic geography, and in revisions,
Fenneman would change the title to Constructive Geography, thus shifting the emphasis
towards the utility of the discipline’s research. In contrast to most of what was termed
commercial or industrial geography at this time, Fenneman’s approach sought to imbue
geography with a sense of purpose. This new paradigm moved commercial geography
away from raw imperialism and encyclopedic cataloging at its root, and towards finding
efficiencies within preexisting economic systems. And though deterministic in its
thinking, it did not necessarily imbue overt racism into the core questions of the
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subdiscipline. In short, Fenneman’s work was outlining a rational, scientific, and
pragmatic approach to increasing economic efficiencies through geographic analysis.
Moreover, what is striking is how clear Fenneman was in articulating these
points—this was a research agenda that could have significant buy-in outside of the
academy. In the interwar period, when geography was at its zenith of its power outside of
the academy, there was a real opportunity to consolidate a discipline that was struggling
to find a ‘legitimate’ research agenda with the continued pragmatics of service to
advancing human society in some way. A rearticulated commercial geography, away
from “anything and everything useful for merchants to know” (Van Dyke Robinson,
1910, p.v) towards a more scientific organization of economic activity had potential to
grow the still-small discipline in meaningful ways.
Aspects of Fenneman’s paper seems to have been inspired by the development of
the Geology and Geography Division of the National Research Council, of which
Fenneman was a member. Initially founded during the First World War to coordinate
war-related research, the organization was forced to restructure in the post-war era.
Fenneman was at the center of these efforts, believing that establishing common research
agendas and funding structures would be good for the discipline as a whole. An unsigned
and undated letter included directly after Fenneman’s 1920 American Geographical
Society presentation in his papers at the University of Cincinnati University Archive
seems to hold clues both to Fennemen’s thinking and his limitations in implementing this
vision of commercial geography.
Sent to sixteen geographers, the letter was an exercise to remove the “general
vagueness” of the “real field for geographic research” for the purpose of finding common
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areas that the National Research Council could emphasis and support for the discipline.
Using Missouri as an example, the letter urged its recipient to make a hypothetical list of
“all kinds of data desired for the purpose named [research], regardless of source,
regardless of whether such data would or would not pass under the name of Geography
when looked at apart from the use here specified, and equally regardless of whether such
data are or are not in existence” (1920: UA-81-35, Box 3, Unpublished Addresses and
Papers). In response to the exercise, Fenneman compiled a list of data sources a page and
half long, and a list of geographic questions, many of which revolved around economic
geography.
For Fenneman, this exercise—created by him or not—obviously spurred him to
present on the topic. However, its impact on the wider discipline was much more muted.
Many of the sixteen selected were geographers either at the end of their academic lives,
firmly entrenched in other ways of thinking, or not pursuing research. 16 Assuming that
the letter was sent in 1920; four of the nine were over the age of fifty. At least two would
die within in the next three years. And perhaps more significantly, many of the
geographers were not looking for new research agendas. Ellsworth Huntington clung to
his deterministic writings until his death in the 1940s, Goode’s research began to turn
more towards cartography, and Lawrence Martin was in government service for the rest
of his career. Although the letter was not exclusively asking about commercial

16 Geographers were only listed by their last name, and only 9 of the 16 were able to be
identified including: William Morris Davis, Alfred Hulse Brooks, Albert Perry Brigham, John
Russell Smith, Rollin Daniel Salisbury, J. Paul Goode, Lawrence Martin, Ray Hughes Whitbeck,
and Ellsworth Huntington.
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geography, the academic base that Fenneman could have used to build support for this
agenda did not materialize.
Moreover with little formal training outside of geology, Fenneman was poorly
equipped to advance scholarship on this front. Correspondence in 1920 with J. Paul
Goode, a trained economist turned geographer at the University of Chicago, indicates that
the two were to work on the “possibilities of co-operation between the departments of
geography and various lines of public service; such as land classification, railway
regional development, trade advice, city survey, and the like” (UA-73-32, Box 1, G
Correspondence) but little seems to have come of these efforts.
During the early 1920s, Fenneman’s work with the National Research Council
(NRC) centered around articulating what the NRC could do to enhance geography and
geology, and significant consideration was given to the development of new funding
structures that could be funneled towards academics (Fenneman, 1922). Here the intent
was not to acquire money from the government, but rather to pursue additional money
from private industry that could be doled out to academics in grant form. Fenneman
found limited success in this role, but the ramifications of obtaining outside money for
research was to be significant to him in the immediate future.
Though never rising above the position of a department chair, Fennemen was a
central figure in administration of the University of Cincinnati. The university, the only
one of its kind, had been chartered by the city of Cincinnati to provide educational and
research opportunities for the city’s residents, and thus there were extensive civic
connections between university administration and high society. Since his arrival at
Cincinnati in 1907, Fenneman had developed extensive contacts within Cincinnati
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society that positioned him well to interface between the academy and industry (Ryan,
1986). In 1922, these contacts materialized with the development of the Cincinnati
Resource Survey, a five-year effort to document and understand the city’s business and
industrial prospects funded by the Commercial Club of Cincinnati (Ryan, 1986). The
results, an 86-page report documenting the industrial strengths and areas for expansion in
the city and an entire room full of collated data available for the use of all interested
parties, provided highly valuable information for business and industry leading to
additional grants. 17 Here deterministic thinking provided key understandings to how the
city could continue to develop its economy.
In an annual report documenting the activities of the survey, Fenneman discussed
the importance of eliminating waste and the economic ramifications of doing so, arguing
that “Every time we eliminate waste, we create wealth.” (Fenneman, 1927, 4). However,
the waste Fenneman was writing about was not just human or industrial waste, but also
waste in human effort, marketing, and “geographically unwise competition”; in other
words, economic waste and inefficiencies (Fenneman, 1927, 4-5). Moreover, the
questions the survey was seeking to answer are reminiscent of the questions generated by
Fenneman in response to his American Geographical Society paper, listing in a question
and answer format, detailed responses to questions about Cincinnati such as: “What raw
materials are in and on the land around us?”, “What things should we not attempt to
produce?”, and “Where can the things that we make be sold, and in what quantities?”

Other economic geographers on the faculty including Earl Case and Daniel Bergsmark
also contributed to these efforts.
17
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(Fenneman, 1927). These questions mesh well with Hartshorne’s article, in the sense they
were seeking to understand how location played a role in the efficiency of the economy.
On this last question, Fenneman discussed the need for detailed understandings of local
economics, especially in areas outside of the city. From this understanding came a need
to document the local conditions of the Cincinnati metro area.
In conjunction with this survey, a donation by the owner of a local biscuit
company sponsored an advanced fellowship on specific topics, stipulating that Fennemen
alone should have discretion to choose the recipient that would do the best work to
enhance the reputation and marketability of the city (UA-73-32, Box 1, Strietmann
Fellowship). Running for five years from 1927 to 1932, Applebaum was the last fellow
selected for this honor. Applebaum’s “advanced graduate study” became a nine-month
comprehensive land use survey and analysis of the greater Cincinnati suburbs and
“secondary commercial areas” to assess their potential for growth.
3.4

Commercial/Industrial/Business Geography in the 1920s: A Slow-Moving SubDiscipline
While commercial geography—sometimes labeled industrial or business

geography—had a long tradition in the discipline with roots back to the 1870s, its
primary issue was its lack of scientific rigor. Most forms of commercial geography were
descriptive in nature, documenting an area’s key exports and natural resources, and their
uses to modern society. This scholarship became the foundation of geography
departments in business schools (such as at the University of Pennsylvania and Columbia
University) and the introduction of commercial geography as an important part of
business education (Goode, 1917; Rowley, 1964).
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Fenneman’s version of commercial geography as a science to improve the
efficiency of the economy, while seemingly of high relevance, was not taken up by most
of the discipline in the 1920s. From 1920 to 1927 more than ten new textbooks on the
topic were published (Handley, 1982). Business schools across the United States added
commerce geography to their curriculum, buoying enrollment, but functionally little had
changed. Even the establishment of the journal Economic Geography in 1926 at Clark
University, did not have an immediate impact upon the quality of business geography
scholarship.
Perhaps the most damning critique of the traditional form of commercial
geography came from none other than Isaiah Bowman. In a ten-page book review of
eleven commercial geography books, Bowman reflected on commercial geography’s rise
within the discipline and its ability to be a science. In order for commercial geography to
be part of modern geography, Bowman wrote that:
“To be a science commercial geography ought by definition to fulfill three
conditions: it should (1) have its facts arranged in a systemic order; (2)
rationally explain present conditions in accordance with established
“laws”; (3) predict the future course of development or lead the way to the
discovery of new laws. . . . The tests applied by one person in a given
solution must be capable of verification at other places and by other men
under standard conditions, just as a physicist or physiologist lays down the
governing conditions of his experiment and confidently invites verification
of a truth or law which he claims to have discovered.”
--(Bowman, 1925, 288)
In Bowman’s analysis commercial geography did none of that. Its emphasis on
“geographical influence” (in other words determinism) and encyclopedic listing of facts
left the subfield weak and out-of-touch with new developments in the discipline
(Bowman, 1925, 286). Further, Bowman argued that main focus of the efforts of
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commercial geography was merely on educating future business leaders and not on
developing a new science; however, if the inverse was these scholar’s intent, the field
was still “too feeble and juvenile” to be truly scientific (Bowman, 1925, 291).
Most notably, J. Paul Goode at the University of Chicago’s work engaged with
Fenneman’s ideas of a scientific and practical commercial geography. One such work
outside of his cartographic contributions examined the geographical influence on
Chicago’s trade networks (Goode, 1926). Similarly sponsored by the Chicago Board of
Trade and the city itself, his study examined how Chicago interacted and traded with the
rest of the world, documenting how the particular geography of the city led to its
economic rise. 18 Hartshorne’s thesis on shipping traffic in Lake Michigan was an
.

outshoot of this work and compromised some of the more developed work in economic
geography during this time. However, unlike Goode whose work seemed to have been
split between cartography and applied geography, Hartshorne saw an opening for more
scientific work in this area, leading to his 1927 paper on the importance of location in
geography.
Entitled “Location as a Factors in Geography,” the article highlighted how the
“relative location” of an entity was the “all-important factor” in understanding not only
how economies functioned but also in how a new business might succeed. Using terms
such as “locus,” “optimum location,” and “relative location” Hartshorne sought to
illuminate the hidden matrix that made some locations more advantageous than others

18 Entitled The Geographic Background of Chicago, the book reads interestingly with Cronon’s
Nature’s Metropolis (1991), in the sense that Goode articulated many of Cronon’s points (in less
detail, of course). For other critical perspectives of Cronon, see Holdsworth, 1994.
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(Hartshorne, 1927). Discussing everything from land prices and taxation rates to the
access of appropriate forms of labor and transportation, the nine-page article sought to
bring a geographical viewpoint to these issues of economics. This wholistic review of a
site mirrored Hartshorne’s long attachment to regional, idiographic geography. For a
young Applebaum, these ideas must have been engrained in his education from
Hartshorne, which he then would have brought to bear on his graduate training in
Cincinnati with a sympathetic Fennemen.
Likely with Hartshorne’s support, Applebaum applied and received the fellowship
at the University of Cincinnati. The fellowship was unique in the sense that Applebaum’s
primary focus was on completing the report that the fellowship was based on and not on
earning a graduate degree. Thus, for the nine-months that Applebaum was in Cincinnati,
he was primarily focused on collecting, collating, and drafting his final report on these
“secondary commercial areas.” In total Applebaum visited 111 different commercial
districts, mapping each in detail, collecting data, and running basic spatial analysis on the
relationship of each district to its surrounding residential area. When presented to the
Commercial Club of Cincinnati, the resulting two volume report was hailed as a
tremendous resource and was “used extensively by real estate men and bankers” as late as
1938 (The Cincinnati Enquirer, 1938).
This urban geographic knowledge yielded a massive and unparalleled collection
of urban data on the Cincinnati suburbs, enabling various forms of capital to better
understand how the city fringes were developing. This marriage of applied economic
geography with some economic and urban geographic theory, and nine-months of
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intensive fieldwork would prove to be an important series of skills and experience for
both Applebaum and the discipline.
3.5

Launching a Professional Career
At the conclusion of his fellowship, Applebaum returned to Minneapolis to

undertake PhD work with Hartshorne. However, his time at Minnesota was cut short by a
job offer back in Cincinnati. Starting in May 1933, Applebaum was employed by the
Kroger Grocery and Baking Company, a Cincinnati-based grocer, as a research
geographer. Tasked with conducting “studies in urban geography from the standpoint of
marketing” (Applebaum, 1942, OSS Application, RG 226, Personnel Files 2166353), his
work was critical to the immediate profitability of Kroger and longer-term prospects of
food retailing in the United States. In light of both economic and urban geography during
this time, Applebaum’s work was original for both its academic content and commercial
utility.
Simply put, food retailing in the United States during the 1920s and early 1930s
was a highly local affair. In contrast to today’s supermarkets, consumers purchased food
goods from small, local corner stores and were served by staff members for each item
they sought to purchase (Zimmerman, 1955). However, in the 1920s as the economy
boomed, the chain grocery store became a fixture of American prosperity. Centralized
purchasing along with low food prices ushered in a period of immense growth in the
chain grocery store industry. As these companies grew larger—Kroger for example grew
from 779 stores in 1920 to more than 5,575 stores in 1930—smaller chains and
independent stores increasingly found themselves merging or going out of business
(Deutsch, 2012, 58). As the decade progressed, dissent towards the “chain stores”
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emerged for their ability to easily undercut independent stores with deep pockets, large
advertising budgets, and coordinated purchasing. In the face of such overwhelming odds,
local shopkeepers organized to address this threat. The result of these sentiments was
proposed legislation at the local and state levels across the nation to tax, regulate, or
outright ban chain stores; placing chain stores on the defensive just as the Great
Depression reached its deepest depths in the early 1930s (Deutsch, 2012, 78).
In addition to negative public sentiment, grocery store chains found the ground
underneath them quickly shifting. Considered as safe bets by Wall Street during the
1920s due to their high stock prices and consistent dividends, the deflationary impact of
the Great Depression hurt their business model hard. Kroger stock, for example, dropped
from $120 a share to a little over $36 a share in 1930 alone. This came on the heels of
Kroger selling more food than they ever had in their entire history as a company
(Deutsch, 2012, 135).
While the Great Depression lowered food prices nationwide, the costs of
maintaining and staffing a large portfolio of small stores each with their own employees,
kept food prices high. In 1930, a regional manager for Kroger by the name of Michael
Cullen wrote to upper management about the prospects for large, self-service, highvolume grocery store. His basic argument was to roll-out a high-volume, low-cost
grocery store that through marketing, would attract large crowds who though they were
saving money. In addition to lower overhead costs, a small number of goods would be
offered “at cost” merely to attract customers into the stores. The rest of the goods would
be marked up to generate a profit, with certain items significantly overpriced compared to
competitors. Through this method, Cullen wrote that:
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“[This model] would be a riot. I would have to call out the police and let
the public in so many at a time. I would lead the public out of the high
priced houses of bondage into the low prices of the house of the promise
land. I would convince the public that I would be able to save from one to
three dollars on their food bills. I would be the ‘miracle man’ of the
grocery business. The public would not, and could not believe their eyes.
Week days would be Saturdays—rainy days would be sunny days, and
then when the great crowd of American people came to buy all those low
priced and 5% [marked up] items, I would have them surrounded with
15%, 20%, and in some cases 25% [marked up] items. In other words, I
could afford to sell a can of Milk at cost if I could sell a can of Peas and
make 2₵, and so on through the grocery line.”
—Letter reproduced in Zimmerman, 1955, 34.
Location would play a critical role in the development of this new form of store, with
Cullen writing:
“Again, you may object to my locating two or three blocks from the
business center of a big city, one great asset in being way from the
business section is parking space. Another is, you can get generally the
kind of store you want and on your own terms. The public will walk an
extra block or two if they can save money, and one of our talking points
would be, the reason we sell at wholesale prices are that we are out of the
high rent district.”
—Letter reproduced in Zimmerman, 1955, 34-35.
In the context of geographic scholarship at the time, the optimum location of this new
form of store was far different from anything in existence at the time. The letter went
unanswered and the President of Kroger refused to meet with Cullen even when he made
a personal visit to the Cincinnati headquarters. Rebuffed by the company, Cullen quit his
job on the spot, moved to New York City, and established King Kullen as the first
American supermarket (Zimmerman, 1955). His logic proved to be quite promising—
using the same business model of bulk buying, selling certain items at discount and
marked up prices, and renting a less-than-desirable but large former auto body shop in
Queens—Cullen found great success in leading the residents of Queens into the promise
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land of cheap food. In less than five years, King Kullen had 15 stores and more than a
dozen of competitors in the New York market (Zimmerman, 1955). 19 Seeing this
phenomenon emerge nationwide, Kroger realized that its business model needed to
change. The impact of these developments was three-fold on their strategy: 1) Kroger
needed to consolidate their store profile into larger, more modern stores, 2) underpreforming stores needed to be shuttered to free up capital to invest in these new stores,
and 3) catering to middle and upper income consumers could provide new ways to bring
in more profit (Deutsch, 2012, 140-141).
In order to facilitate these goals, the company established the Kroger Food
Foundation, as its research arm to investigate any number of topics related to food
retailing ranging from food science to marketing (Phillips, 1936). While other work
specifically focused on the quality of the food itself or how to sell more of it,
Applebaum’s work in the foundation was fundamental to conveying that food to
consumers. From the perspective of management, the establishment of new supermarkets
was a highly risky venture. In order to work, the company had to shutter existing stores in
order to open one large supermarket. Monetary outlays for each individual supermarket
were high and required extensive planning to operate. The key factor in all of this—the
location of a store and its relation to the rest of city—became of critical importance to the
establishment of new supermarkets. Applebaum, armed with intimate knowledge of each

19 Of marginal importance to this paper, but an interesting “thoughtworm” nonetheless, is the
relationship between early supermarkets and rise of our current political state. After losing his
home construction business with the onset of the Great Depression, Fred Trump started his own
successful supermarket in the same neighborhood as the original King Kullen. This store was
later purchased by King Kullen to eliminate competition, providing him the capital to reenter the
housing market.
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of Cincinnati’s suburban shopping districts and advanced knowledge of urban geography,
was a natural candidate for this position. Within two years, Applebaum had been
promoted to Chief of Staff for the Marketing Research Department, supervising all
marketing research for the company (Applebaum, 1942, OSS Application, RG 226,
Personnel Files 2166353).
This period of professional success was enhanced by his rising stature within
academic geography—although he had not completed his Master’s degree at the
University of Cincinnati or progressed beyond the first year of his doctoral program, he
presented on some of his research methods at the 1935 Association of American
Geographers conference in St. Louis (Applebaum, 1952, 1). During this era, the
Association of American Geographers was a group of elite academic geographers whose
membership and participation at annual meetings was carefully guarded and curated.
Presenting at the annual meeting required either full membership in the Association (and
thus an academic position, which Applebaum did not possess) or sponsorship of one’s
paper by someone who was a full member (Barnes and Farish, 2006; James et al., 1979).
While it is unclear whether Hartshorne or Fenneman sponsored the paper, it is indicative
that a senior academic felt that Applebaum’s work was of general interest to the rest of
the discipline.
His paper, the same one published in Economic Geography in 1952, explained
how to use of Sanborn fire insurance maps to construct a population and land use map.
The implication, when first presented in 1935, began a discussion about how business
entities could easily acquire and process relevant geographic information and reflect the
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set of techniques that Applebaum had used extensively while working with Kroger. 20
Here the emphasis on the best use of land reflected a broader concern in the United States
to spur economic growth and development. Indeed, in July 1935 Applebaum and J. I.
Falconer (a professor of rural economics at Ohio State University) presented on this topic
to the Cincinnati Regional Planning Commission. Although approaching the topic of
efficient land use from a different perspective, the emphasis on the semi-rural was
crucial. As Falconer noted, “the land policy in the United States had changed from a
system of colonization to a process of placing land to the use to which it was best suited,”
while Applebaum remarked that “Conditions today [in locating retail stores] call for
much greater efficiency in the feld [sic], with a maximum elimination of costly mistakes”
(The Cincinnati Enquirer, 1935). Thus, untenable agricultural land would be better
utilized for urban purposes such as housing or retail, with Applebaum’s locational
techniques paving the way for an enhanced and more profitable commercial experience.
These techniques were tested out in the local surroundings of Cincinnati. In 1927,
the city boasted 446 individual grocery stores. 21 Six years later, more than a hundred
outlets had been shuttered, and by 1940 only 247 outlets remained in the city. Moreover,
only 27% of the 446 individual stores (a total of 119 stores) were still operating in the
same location in 1940 as they were in 1927. Throughout this period, Kroger retained a
significant majority of the grocery stores in the city, hovering around 47% of all outlets in

20 In the context of the urban geography of the time, this was quite innovative. As Wheeler and
Brunn have described, there was little urban geography in the 1930s and the urban geography that
would emerge at the University of Chicago in the 1940s largely developed after Applebaum’s
contributions (Wheeler and Brunn, 2002).
21 Data for this section came from Grocerteria.com and the US Census Bureau. I am in debt to
Ashanté Reese’s Black Food Geographies for discovering this dataset (Reese, 2019).
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the city, even while 46% of its 1927 stores were shuttered. This shift in food retailing
practices was likely driven by a combination of the general economic downturn that was
the Great Depression, a need for greater efficiency from each individual retail outlet, and
Applebaum’s skills in understanding basic site selection. Here, the largest changes in
overall grocery stores were located in suburban and majority Black census tracts (Figure
3.2). These economic logics that manifested in Applebaum’s site selection criteria can be
seen for their implementation in the morphology of the built environment.
In suburban areas, land was cheaper to acquire and develop, and in addition,
suburbanites were more likely to have access to their own cars which they could use to
drive to these new stores. Combined with the lack of home development during the Great
Depression, the centralization of grocery stores proved easier to achieve in the suburbs.
In majority Black neighborhoods, consolidation of grocery stores came about due to the
impacts of systemic racism, which reduced income and thus profit for individual grocery
stores in these neighborhoods, leading to the shuttering of various stores.
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Figure 3.2 Map showing change in overall grocery store count by census tract
between 1927 and 1940. (Boundaries from NHGIS, grocery data from Grocerteria).

In 1938, Applebaum moved to Boston to become the Director of Market Research
and Coordination for the Economy Grocery Store Corporation, today known as Stop &
Shop (The Cincinnati Enquirer, 1938). Earning $10,000 a year (roughly equivalent to
over $180,000 today), Applebaum was tasked with slimming down Stop & Shop’s
footprint while increasing market share. Indeed, Applebaum was able to implement this
quite successfully, leading the company to increased profitability in a time of economic
scarcity and wartime constrains. As Figure 3.3 shows, in the nine years from fiscal year
1938 to 1946 (the last year data was available), Stop & Shop shuttered more than 250
stores while quadrupling overall sales per store (Stop & Shop, Inc., 1946).
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Stop & Shop Store Consolidation, 1938-1946
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Figure 3.3 Stop & Shop Store Consolidation from 1938 to 1946. Not pegged to
inflation. (Information from Stop & Shop, Inc., 1946)

Here deterministic thinking played a key role in forming the trading area of
grocery stores during this period. Taking in account the physical conditions of the built
environment (location of suitable buildings, types of stores located in adjacent units,
transportation infrastructure), in conjunction with the social conditions (economic status,
race), and overall competition, enabled grocery store planners to predict with some
degree of perceived certainty the likelihood of a new establishment to succeed. Being
able to predict the success of a business entity thus became a highly valuable skill
necessary for the emergence of major food retailers.
Moreover, in contrast to the work in urban and economic geographies and other
allied social science disciplines, Applebaum’s work filled an important niche in
understanding the urban and economic geographies of the city. While the period from the
1920s to the 1940s saw the emergence of these subfields, academics were largely
concerned with understanding how the city functioned and developed. This meta-level
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analysis led to the development of various generalizable models about how urban
development occurred on a “universal” scale (Burgess, 1935). In other words, academics
could explain how neighborhoods went through cycles or the reasonings behind the
relocation of certain industries to various sections of the city. They could not, however,
explain why a particular industry would or would not succeed in a specific parcel of land.
Nor could they predict with any generalizable degree of certainty where specific
industries would best succeed. Even more formal theories such as Central Place
Theory—first published in 1933 in German and not readily taken up in American
geography until the 1940s—only articulated a certain distribution of a phenomena on the
surface of the Earth (Ullman, 1941). Even when applied to specific phenomena, the most
useful information that Central Place Theory could reveal is the general location where
something should be located. 22
Applebaum’s deterministic methodology provided key, actionable
recommendations for where a grocery store would succeed. Even if the various forms of
evidence were based on crude methods and personal understandings of the city, these
findings were welcomed due to the overall lack of knowledge on the city in general. Also
working in Applebaum’s favor was the industry of his choice: the continuous demand for
food mean that it was unlikely for a store to be entirely unprofitable. Rather, the measure
of success was based on the overall rate of return and amount of materialized profits.

22 It is also important to note here Central Place Theory was also intertwined with negative
impacts on the world, specifically in Nazi Germany’s economic planning and strategizing
(Rösslør, 1989). Central Place Theory would also provide the theoretical background of other
quantitative attempts to predict and understand retail environments (Berry, 1967).
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Additionally, the practice of site selection was generally in its infancy; therefore, any
improvements were welcomed regardless of the logic behind them.
3.6

Service and Teaching: Applebaum During World War II and the Post-War
Era
Irrespective of how Applebaum was acquiring this information, the connections

he forged between industry, academic, and government proved to be useful as he
continued to develop his career. Applebaum’s move to Boston was accompanied by an
increase in both job duties and professional recognition. Yet, much of this was
interrupted by the outbreak of the Second World War. The United States, which had
returned to its isolationist roots in the 1920s, found itself wholly unprepared for the idea
of a global war in all of its facets. In particular, however, there was a dearth of
intelligence information about the world. These informational agencies were spread
across the government from the State Department to the military to the Library of
Congress. With little rhyme or reason, it became clear that there was a need for a unified
intelligence agency to collect high-level information about the world (Flint and Kirsch,
2012). The solution to this was the formation of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).
Overseen by Franklin D. Roosevelt’s law school friend, William Donovan, the
OSS became the premier intelligence gathering and covert operations agency in the
nation. A central part of these activities was the formation of the Research and Analysis
(R&A) Division overseen by Harvard historian William L. Langer and within that, the
geography division headed by Richard Hartshorne. Hartshorne, whose national profile
and high-level connections had only risen with the publication of The Nature of
Geography in 1939, was well positioned to lead this unit and recruited an immense
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number of high-profile and budding scholars whose work was influential to
understanding social conditions in various territories around the world (Barnes, 2006). As
part of the leadership, Hartshorne invited Applebaum to work as his second-in-command
(NARA, OSS). In 1942, Applebaum was granted a leave of absence from Stop & Shop
and moved to Washington, DC to assist Hartshorne. In this role, he would have interfaced
with an extensive group of geographers, many of whom would go onto have a significant
impact in the discipline in the post-war era. Less than a year later, Applebaum was
promoted to be the special assistant to head of the entire RA division, William Langer
(Applebaum, 1942, OSS Application, RG 226, Personnel Files 2166353). 23
In this role, Applebaum’s duties revolved around the organization and flow of
information. In addition to being Langer’s personal assistant, he served as the secretary of
the R&A Executive Committee which discussed high-level intelligence issues. He
interfaced extensively with the Librarian of Congress, Archibald MacLeish, in
establishing a special room in the library for researchers to conduct classified research
(Applebaum, 1943, Correspondence between OSS and the Library of Congress, RG 226,
General Correspondence, Folders 10-12). But perhaps of highest significance was his
work overseas.
Roughly a third of the R&A staff (approximately 400 people) was scattered across
the globe and while each was in regular communication with Washington, there was a
need for streamlined communication between these entities. In April 1944, Applebaum

23 While officially classified as a promotion, there may have been conflict between highly
degreed academics and the graduate-degreeless Applebaum, which made a “promotion” the best
option for all.
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embarked on what would become a five-month trip around the globe to assist in the
operations of each outpost. While some of his detail was routine administrative work
such as implementing policy, other matters around the organization of specific branches
and the streamlining of the relationship between the outposts and Washington was critical
work in ensuring that the flow of intelligence information remained efficient
(Applebaum, 1944, Mission to the Outposts, RG 226, Box 28).
A thick report, complied upon his return to Washington, entitled Mission to the
Outposts documents Applebaum’s activities during these months, showing just how
crucial his role was to the orderly functioning of the R&A’s intelligence gathering
activities (Applebaum, 1944, Mission to the Outposts, RG 226, Box 28). In addition to
organizing and surveying the function of each outpost, assessing its facilities including
infrastructure and available information, and assessing the distribution of personnel,
Applebaum frequently undertook special missions for Langer, implemented high-level
reorganization of R&A activities in the outposts, and collected information and
periodicals in places such as Palestine. Over these five months, Applebaum traveled
around the world starting in Great Britain before heading to Italy, Algeria, Egypt, India,
Ceylon, Burma, and China. While finding complete records on Applebaum’s actions
overseas is difficult, a medical report from early December 1944 upon his return to
Washington indicates that at some point he served behind Japanese lines (Applebaum,
1944, Medical Report, RG 226, Personnel Files 2166353). Moreover, his accounting and
acquisition of Palestinian periodicals and other forms of intelligence—which were left off
official after-action reports—seems to indicate that other special missions were carried
out on an as-needed basis.
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Working at such high levels in the OSS, he most certainly would have been on a
first name basis with a variety of academic geographers. And while each position in the
OSS was unique, Applebaum’s contributions to the OSS were more diverse than most.
His excellence in marshalling information merited him a nomination from Langer and
Donovan to be awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, then the third highest military
award. While OSS administrators concurred about the merit of Applebaum’s work, the
Distinguished Service Medal was reserved only for Generals and the occasional Colonel
(Ball, 1945, Memorandum for Dr. William L. Langer, RG 226, Personnel Files 2166353).
Thus, Applebaum was nominated for the Legion of Merit, which in 1945, was the highest
non-combat medal that could be awarded. The proposed citation was written as follows:
“For meritorious achievement in connection with military operations
against an enemy of the United States; Lieutenant William Applebaum,
USMCR, organized the Washington Outpost Office of the Research and
Analysis Branch, responsible for coordinating and providing the field units
with personnel, intelligence, materials and services, serving the United
States military and other Government agencies in several Theaters of
Operation. Through his efforts, essential to proper performance, prepared
a detailed manual and trained a staff to carry on the work in the face of a
rapidly increasing flow of intelligence, dispatches and communications,
requiring extraordinary skills, initiative and perseverance. Lt. Applebaum
worked prodigiously in the Branch Outposts in the United Kingdom,
Algeria, Italy, Egypt, Ceylon, China and Burma, and facilitated the
dissemination of intelligence to SHAEF, the Army Air Forces, Allied
Military Governments overseas and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and branches
of the Army and Navy in Washington. He stimulated the field outposts in
expediting and procuring foreign scientific and technical publications
originating from enemy and enemy occupied territories. His wisdom,
innate knowledge and resourcefulness contributed towards eliminating
duplication of research effort within the Research and Analysis Branch.
The entire service of Lieutenant Applebaum to the Government of the
United States has been honorable.”
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—Proposed Citation (Donovan, 1945, Recommendation for the
Award of the Legion of Merit to Lt. William Applebaum,
USMCR, RG 226, Personnel Files 2166353)
Applebaum’s work clearly was highly important to the proper functioning of the
Research and Analysis division—while his contributions in terms of geographic
knowledge were limited, his ability to marshal and manage immense flows of geographic
information set him apart from others during this time. While appealed, the award was
ultimately not approved due to Applebaum’s rank as a Lieutenant (and not as a field
grade officer), and Applebaum was instead awarded the Bronze Star Medal (NARA,
OSS). Regardless, Donovan himself remarked that Applebaum was “a brilliant organizer”
and Colonel David Bruce (later a US Ambassador to France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom) stated that he was “an outstanding officer of unparalleled organizational
ability” (Mattingly, 1989).
With the end of the war, Applebaum returned to Boston and Stop & Shop. The
decade immediately following the war would be one of the most productive and awardfilled for Applebaum, reflecting his importance to a rapidly changing American
economy. In 1948, Applebaum was promoted to the Director of Planning and
Coordination at Stop & Shop. A year later he was again promoted to Assistant General
Manager, which also came with voting privileges on the company’s board of directors
(The Boston Globe, 1949). This coincided with a stint as a consultant to the National
Security Council’s Research and Development Board (1948-1952), a 250-member panel
of civilian and military experts tasked with assisting the military in ensuing operational
readiness for the country should war breakout again (Cutler, 1956; Harvard University,
2005).
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At the same time, Applebaum began more extensive academic work, both in
geography and in the burgeoning field of marketing. In this latter field he was especially
influential, serving as a founding member and part of the editorial staff of the Journal of
Marketing (Applebaum, 1966, 1947). Combined with frequent speaking engagements at
major research universities including Clark University, the University of Wisconsin, the
University of Massachusetts, and Stanford University and even the discussion of a
Professorship at the University of Washington’s business school; Applebaum was well
connected to academic discourse in geography and marketing (Harvard Business School
Archives, Faculty Biographical Information, William Applebaum, Carton 2, Folder
GB2.152 and University of Washington Special Collections, Edward Louis Ullman
Papers, Box 2, Folder 5, Letter to Applebaum, 2/3/1954). This period also saw a more
active publishing agenda in both geography and marketing. As part of these efforts, to
assist Kroger in determining its market share in midwestern states, he hired an extensive
number of geography faculty and graduate students to conduct paid summer research
(Cohen, 1956).
At the same time, Applebaum’s personal connections to academic geography
began to grow stronger, specifically around the program at Harvard University. 24
Applebaum, who had become close friends Edward Ullman during the war, had been
hired into the Harvard program (University of Washington Special Collections, Edward
Louis Ullman Papers, Box 2, Folder 5, Letter to Ullman, 5/7/1946). Moreover,
Applebaum’s old advisor, mentor, and friend Richard Hartshorne was good friends with

24 The program at Harvard was combined with the geology program, forming a joint department
of Geography and Geology, thus the elimination of geography at Harvard was closure of the
program in geography as opposed to a department (Smith, 1987).
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Derwent Whittlesey, the chair of program in geography, likely facilitating a connection
between these two. It had been under Whittlesey’s editorship of the Annals of the
Association of American Geographers that the full-text of Hartshorne’s The Nature of
Geography had been published in serial form (Barnes and Farish, 2006). Combined with
Stop & Shop’s headquarters in Boston, connections between professional geographers
and a major geography program was bound to occur.
Indeed, in early January 1950, The Boston Globe ran a nearly full-page article
(Figure 3.4) on page seven discussing efforts between The Globe’s staff, Applebaum and
the Stop & Shop research team, and Harvard geographers and cartographers to produce
the first up-to-date map of the Boston metropolitan area in nearly twenty years (Kline,
1950). The undertaking funded by Stop & Shop, supervised by Applebaum and Ullman,
and drawn by former OSS cartographers employed by the department, relied on data
collected by students. Central to this this data collection was Kenneth W. Walter, a
geography graduate student at Syracuse University, who personally “walked through 43
cities and towns, street by street, classifying shopping centers.” In recognition of his
efforts, the title of the article reflected the immense amount of effort Walter went to
stating that “Student Wore Out a Pair of Shoes Every Two Weeks Getting Material for
Globe’s Map of Metropolitan Boston.” As The Globe noted, “most developments since
1928 were not mapped on any one base map” rendering the ability to see an accurate
version of the entire metropolitan area impossible (Kline, 1950). Moreover, while
initially developed for the siting of new stores, it was thought there would be “wide
application to other commercial and public activities” including city planning, real estate
development, mortgage appraisal, research in urban geography, and marketing. Indeed,
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the map had already been utilized to site the location of various tuberculosis x-ray units
to ensure that the entire population was covered (Figure 3.5).

Figure 3.4 Article from The Boston Globe documenting Applebaum’s efforts with
the Harvard geography program to create a new map of the Boston area (Kline,
1950).
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Figure 3.5 Section of the final map produced by the program. Note the large blank
space left on the legend, for the printing of additional information at a later time,
which is not present in the map in Figure 3.4. (American Geographical Society
Library, University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee).

These highly detailed, intricate encounters with the department were underpinned
by Applebaum’s role in assisting various graduate students in completing their studies.
For example, in November 1951, Applebaum wrote to Ullman—now at the University of
Washington—about one of the last PhD students enrolled in the program:
“No doubt, by now, you have had a chance to go over Howard Green’s
thesis. My reason for bringing it up is that I would like to enlist your help
to bring this Ph.D. degree matter to a conclusion. We have some longer
range plans for Howard, and the sooner that this is behind him, the better
for all concerned.”
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— University of Washington Special Collections, Edward Louis
Ullman Papers, Box 2, Folder 5, Letter to Ullman, 11/15/1951).
Howard Green would be hired by Stop & Shop to conduct market research before
heading to Chicago to work in site selection with Montgomery Ward (Green, 1961).
Green was not the only student that Applebaum helped however: Saul Cohen, the last
geography PhD student at Harvard and one of the few Jewish students in geography, was
heavily influenced by Applebaum. From Cohen’s graduation in 1956 to the early 1960s,
the two worked closely in a variety of business geography projects including both
academic texts and consulting work (discussed more at length further in this chapter).
While the fate of the program was already sealed in 1948, Applebaum’s involvement
with geography and Harvard continued even after the ending of formal classes in 1956
(the year of Whittlesey’s death).
In 1954, at the age of 47, Applebaum retired from Stop & Shop all together,
embarking with his wife on a nine-month tour of Europe and the Middle East (The
Boston Globe, 1954). Upon his return to Boston, he began consulting work and a new
academic career starting as a Visiting Lecturer in Food Distribution with the Harvard
Business School. While the courses that he taught were not inherently geographical—in
the names of the courses, nor in the discussion of topics—the emphasis on distribution
and retailing of goods reflected an applied geographic tradition that Applebaum had spent
his career developing. With courses like “Retail Merchandizing of Consumer Goods,”
“Retail Management and Control,” and “Strategy Problems in Mass Distribution,”
Applebaum imparted a career’s worth of knowledge of the mass retailing business to a
generation of Harvard Business School students (Harvard University, 1958). In the
context of 1950s and 1960s—a period of unprecedented growth in the size of business
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and American consumerism—Applebaum’s classes were an important contribution to the
growth of this system. It also placed geography in the business school with other Ivy
League schools such as University of Pennsylvania and Columbia University.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is also clear that much of this growth was
underpinned by business school graduates. The entire process of development—from the
identification of a new markets, the selection of possible sites, the negotiation process,
and the ultimate opening of new businesses was increasingly orchestrated by
professionals trained in the process of marketing and the economics of business. This
position became permanent in 1960, when the visiting designation was removed from his
title (Harvard Business School Archives, Faculty Biographical Information, William
Applebaum, Carton 2, Folder GB2.152). Throughout this time, Applebaum worked
extensively with a fellow business school professor Malcom P. Salmon, who also
specialized in the business of retail enterprises to better understand the hidden economics
of mass retailing. Throughout this period, Applebaum’s publications and reputation
continued to increase. From 1950 to 1954, he served as the chair of the joint National
Research Council and Association of American Geographers Committee on Careers in
Geography; from 1958 to 1961 as a member of Office of Naval Research grants
committee which funded much early quantitative geography work, and as a member of
various United States Department of Agriculture research and marketing activities from
1950 to 1964 (Harvard Business School Archives, Faculty Biographical Information,
William Applebaum, Carton 2, Folder GB2.152). In 1959, the Association of American
Geographers awarded him the Citation of Merit, then the highest award that the
Association of American Geographers then gave out to members (American Association
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of Geographers, n.d.). Along with various Harvard graduate students, he represented
geography at early Regional Science Association meetings (Isard, 2003). Applebaum
continued government work in the early 1960s, traveling to India and Yugoslavia as part
of the “Food for Peace” missions which sought end violence through the distribution of
excess American food (The Boston Globe, 1964).
This period was also associated with a marked increase in foreign research and
consulting work, particularly in Western Europe. Applebaum is known to have worked
with several German retailers, and several articles were republished in German and
French language retail trade magazines (Harvard Business School Archives, Faculty
Biographical Information, William Applebaum, Carton 2, Folder GB2.152). It is also
clear that Applebaum was ahead of his time on important trends in both food marketing
and business administration. In the mid-1960s, he discussed the importance of electronic
data processing and the likelihood the mass-market “cash and carry” food distribution
warehouses would become important players in the food distribution market, anticipating
the rise of current large retailers like Costco and Sam’s Club and their associated data
management systems (Harvard Business School Archives, Faculty Biographical
Information, William Applebaum, Carton 1, Folder GC.151).
Yet, the 1960s were also a period of difficult relations with the discipline. While
the discipline had largely abandoned deterministic thinking by the end of World War II,
replaced by regional geography and area studies, changes were afoot. The rise of
quantification in the 1950s, which would lead to the Quantitative Revolution in the
1960s, signaled yet another shift in the energies of the discipline. Although Applebaum’s
work was inherently quantitative it was also regionalisitic and thus he would find
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difficultly in building a larger research agenda. His work was too practical, not
theoretical in the slightest, and did not fit neatly in either disciplinary paradigm. His
numerical data was childsplay compared to the emerging spatial sciences and his regions
were micro-regions, on the scale of the market area of a store and its overall influence.
While obviously more successful then Fenneman was in the 1920s, Applebaum faced
similar challenges in generating sustained academic interest in his vision of the
discipline. Perhaps more importantly, Applebaum’s lack of an academic position,
graduate degrees, and Jewish faith likely left him a marginal player in an increasingly
professionalized academy (Kobayashi, 2014). Thus, by the mid-1960s, Applebaum
largely had begun to focus on developing the field of marketing and monetizing his skill,
in essence developing a larger presence outside of geography.
This observation was known and acknowledged within the discipline. In addition
to his international consulting work, Applebaum’s written work was heavily read
internationally. For example, Ross Davies, a professor of geography at University of
Newcastle upon Tyne in the United Kingdom heavily cited Applebaum’s work in his in
his book Marketing Geography stating that “William Applebaum is widely regarded as
the chief architect of marketing geography as a sperate field of study in the United States.
He defined the subject as being ‘concerned with the delimitation and measurement of
markets and with the channels of distribution through which goods move from producer
to consumer’” (Davies, 1976, 2). Davies continued, summarizing Applebaum’s position
that marketing geography—of which site selection was a critical—was an applied and not
inherently “purely academic” subject. He also stated that “Applebaum, indeed,
campaigned for the subject as a visiting lecturer to the Harvard Graduate School of
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Business Studies [sic], rather than establishing himself within a geography department”
(Davies, 1976, 3). While such a bold statement may not truly reflect Applebaum’s
desires, it does speak to the discipline’s failures to integrate Applebaum into the
discipline.
3.7

Determinism in Geographic Thinking
Applebaum’s form of thinking, I argue, was a form of “commercial determinism,”

which was present to some degree in the economic work of both Hartshorne and
Fenneman. While geography has extensively studied and documented the history of
environmental determinism in the discipline for its racist and discriminatory conclusions
which were mobilized in the name of colonialism and the Holocaust, the larger concept
of determinism as a philosophical concept has been less explored (Peet, 1985; Platt,
1948).
Determinism, as a philosophical concept, is generally defined as a worldview
where phenomena can be explained and predicted as a matter of natural law (Hoefer,
2016). Environmental determinism is largely defined as “a type of reasoning that holds
the character and form of a society, culture or body can be explained by the physical
conditions within which it has developed” (Gregory, 2009, 196-197). Extending this to
commercial activities, this definition might be rewritten as: a type of reasoning that holds
that the character and form of an economic activity can be explained by the social and
physical conditions within which it has developed. As a basis for inquiry, it presupposes
that economic activities arise out of the particular social and physical conditions of any
given location, providing a framework for understanding why economic activities have
developed in a certain way and how it might emerge in the future. As a paradigm of
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geographical thinking, determinism is one analytical lens that can be applied to a given
issue and in terms of “applied” work it presents a highly useful theoretical lens for the
formation of a new physical world.
Moreover, similar to the conclusion of environmental determinism, issues arose
the impacts of all form of deterministic scholarship. While individual empirics could be
on their own valid, the overall conclusions functioned largely independent of the
evidence. For example, in Ellen Churchill Semple’s writings on eastern Kentucky, she
correctly identified major factors of the physical environment which impacted the
development of human society such as the aggressive slope of the mountains which made
travel difficult and dissuaded the emergence of an enslaved labor driven economy
(Semple, 1910). However, her larger emphasis on normative models and the assumption
that eastern Kentucky strove to be “modern” like other rural communities, asserted that
these communities and peoples were backwards and needed help advancing into new
registers of development. The results of environmental deterministic thinking were
overtly racist actions which sought to improve the human race through ethnic cleansing
(Giaccaria and Minca, 2016). Similarly, commercial determinism relied on
amalgamations of scientific facts and assumptions to produce information to make
decisions on where to locate a new store. Moreover, determinism gained its power
through the framework within which it was applied. As Fenneman stated, this drive to
reduce economic waste could be pioneered though site selection, but to what ends? Small
grocery stores and larger supermarkets could both be successfully studied under this
intellectual framework, but the process of actually implementing these changes operated
at the level of practice.
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In one of Applebaum’s earliest publications to expand upon his methods, cowritten with Saul Cohen, they described similar issues (Cohen and Applebaum, 1960). 25
In working to determine the market area of individual stores, the paper blended
traditional models of urban morphology with business, asserting that stores in planned
shopping centers performed better than stores located within neighborhoods. This
marketing equilibrium sought to understand how location, existing stores, and supply
chains impacted the overall profitability of stores, with an eye towards practical utility of
increasing more profit (Cohen and Applebaum, 1960). For example, Figure 3.6 shows
how the development of a new supermarket led to a changing trading area for each store.

25 While this article was not issued when Applebaum was employed by a supermarket chain, the
rash of publishing he engaged in during the 1960s seems to be driven by a desire to earn credit
(both financially and in terms of reputation) of the trade secrets, techniques, and general retail
expertise he had developed during the previous thirty years.
As an additional point of reference, the article acknowledged the importance of twenty scholars
and practitioners to the completion of the article. This included 5 geographers (Edward Akerman,
Hans Carol, Richard Hartshorne, Raymond Murphy, and Edward Ullman), 6 business school
faculty members (from Harvard, University of Illinois, and University of Pennsylvania), and 8
professional geographers/planners/site selection specialists (from firms including Stop & Shop,
Kroger, Star Market, and Montgomery Ward). The final acknowledgement, to Eileen Schell as a
cartographic assistant, is also of note. She was an early graduate student of Saul Cohen’s at
Boston University, trained in cartography with Erwin Raisz, and after founding her own site
selection consultancy firm would go onto serve as the Secretary of Consumer Affairs of
Massachusetts from 1979-1983.
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Figure 3.6 Map showing changes in supermarket trading area due to supermarket
consolidation, competition, and relocation. (Cohen and Applebaum, 1960)
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However, location was not the only important characteristic of this work. In general,
their emphasis on the physical characteristics of the landscape could also assist in all
determining how a store preformed. These included the following metrics:
•
•
•

Per capita sales/local income levels
Access and condition of road networks/drive time from housing to retail locations
Location of competition/availability of suitable sites

Thus, in general, the ideal market would be a growing, medium-sized city with little
other competition and high incomes. This would allow for a new chain to secure the best
sites, create a market presence, expand as the city grew all while profiting. As
Applebaum and Cohen concluded, “Under rational behavior of retail society, strong and
well-informed competition is the best agent for maintaining dynamic equilibrium within
market areas” (Cohen and Applebaum, 1960). In other words, under these ideal
conditions, retailors would be able to maximize profit and provide the best use of the
land.
As a basic service, food retailing is a small-profit margin, large volume business—
meaning that while everyone needs food, many different people sell it, driving down the
overall price and profits. The movement towards grocery store consolidation was thus an
exercise in maximizing retail at scale, inherently lowering prices through mass buying,
undercutting one’s competitors, and then finding ways to profit. Thus, Applebaum’s
career in the supermarket industry occurred at the best time: he was able to guide the
transition from an overbuilt, inefficient system to a centralized, more efficient system,
leaving the industry before the supermarket industry became saturated.
In addition, while determining the optimal location for a supermarket was critical to
its success, as a predictive measure, the criteria Applebaum used only eliminated the
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worst sites from consideration. In essence, he could ensure that a store would not be
unprofitable because of high taxes, poor site configuration, or market saturation, but he
could not make the store turn a profit. Nor could he accurately predict if the store would
be profitable even if the most ideal site was selected, due to the actions of outside parties
(for example, poor in-store management, opening of competitors, increase in traffic,
etcetera). As Figure 3.7 shows, even modes for new store equilibrium, assumed constant
growth without an understanding of underlying conditions outside of the physical
environment.

Figure 3.7 General model articulated by Cohen and Applebaum regarding the need
for new stores in a given area. While inherently reductive, there is little indicating
other factors which may reduce economic demand. (Cohen and Applebaum, 1960)

As a tool for analysis and decision making, determinism was a useful yet flawed
framework. In the pursuit of knowledge and as a science, however, it was most certainly
not the most relevant intellectual framework. The backlash against determinism within
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the discipline was against both environmental determinism but also determinism in
general. For example, in Carl Sauer’s 1940 Presidential address, he wrote that:
The American geography of today is essentially a native product;
predominantly it is bred in the Middle West, and, in dispensing with
serious consideration of cultural or historical processes it reflects strongly
its background. In the Middle West, original cultural differences faded
rapidly in the forging of a commercial civilization based on great natural
resources. Perhaps nowhere else and at no other time has a great
civilization been shaped so rapidly, so simply, and so directly out of the
fat of the land and the riches of the subsoil. Apparently here, if anywhere,
the formal logic of costs and returns dominated a rationalized and steadily
expanding economic world. The growth of American geography came
largely at a time when it seemed reasonable to conclude that under any
given situation of natural environment there was one best, most
economical expression of use, adjustment, or response. Was not the
Corn Belt the logical expression of soil and climate of the prairies? Did
not its capital, Chicago, show in the character and energy of its growth the
manifest destiny inherent in its position at the southern extremity of Lake
Michigan, toward the eastern margin of the Prairies? Did not the green sea
of corn that overwhelmed the native prairie grasses represent an ideal
realization of the most economical use of a site, as did the bending of the
strands of communication to meet at the dynamic center of Chicago? Here
the growth of centers of heavy industry at points of most economic
assembly of raw materials was an almost mathematical demonstration of
the function of ton-miles, somewhat conventionalized in terms of freight
rate structure.
—Emphasis added, (Sauer, 1941)
As Cronon so masterfully described in Nature’s Metropolis, this explanation of
the rise of Chicago does not match up to the historical record, which shows a far
messier, uncertain, and highly contested march towards its dominance of the
Midwestern United States (Cronon, 1991). While the above worldview reflected a
stereotypical understanding of determinism writ large, it did demonstrate the
errors in logic that deterministic thinking led to. Pushing deterministic thinking to
the side allowed for a regional and historical geography paradigm to emerge,
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which enabled for a more nuanced understanding of the various factors
influencing a given area. Yet even within this lens aspects of deterministic
thinking emerged, mainly around the creation and delineation of regions
themselves. An analysis of any phenomena in the Midwestern United States
necessitated a determination of what the Midwest was—did one choose by state
boundaries? County boundaries? Generalized boundaries that created a core and
periphery of a region?
Applebaum’s failure to integrate with the discipline on a theoretical basis largely
placed his work in the category of applied scholarship. Especially by the early 1960s,
when regional studies was at its zenith and the Quantitative Revolution was just dawning,
Applebaum’s work did not fit in either camp. For example, Brian Berry, one of the
original University of Washington “Space Cadets,” engaged with many of the same
topics as Applebaum. Berry’s dissertation essentially took a quantitative and Central
Place Theory-informed view to the development of shopping centers in Spokane,
Washington, utilizing ongoing research funded through the newly implemented federal
Interstate Highways Systems to understand the linkages between traffic and development.
In his dissertation, Berry noted Applebaum’s contributions to two studies
conducted in conjunction with The Boston Globe (discussed previously in this chapter)
and The Cincinnati Enquirer in determining the structures of urban business in these
cities. Berry wrote that both were a “failure … to identify precise hierarchical structuring
of urban business, and also what is recognized in this study as the supplies-repair-arterial
business confirmation…”, seemingly unaware of what exactly the goal of these studies
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was (Berry, 1958, 3). In essence, the two were talking past each other from different
theoretical perspectives.
Within a decade of his graduation in 1958, Berry had risen to be a full Professor
at the University of Chicago Department of Geography (Berry, n.d.) and in 1967, he
authored the Geography of Market Centers and Retail Distribution as part of the
Foundations of Economic Geography Series. This series, which issued short specialized
books documenting major topics in economic geography, was widely construed in its
focus documenting traditional economic geography topics such as international trade and
manufacturing, but also including topics as diverse as population geography, natural
resources, agriculture, and urban land use, making series a highly useful resource for
mid-century geographers. In the book, Berry advanced his argument for a quantitative
and Central Place Theory-driven understanding of retail, advancing many of his views
about urban and economic development.
Saving the shortest chapter of the shortest section of the book (comprising only
five and a half pages) to discuss marketing geography, Berry described the field as “at
best [having paid] only lip service to the existence of a field of marketing and an
expanding body of literature called marketing science…” (Berry, 1967, 126). He went
onto write:
“That the marketing geographers should fail to build their work, after
Applebaum’s 1954 plea, within the framework of marketing science is
understandable, since geography as a whole was for many years inward
looking and often insensitive to progress in related subjects. What is
surprising is that they should also have overlooked or rejected as “too
abstract” the pioneering theoretical contributions of Christaller and the
formalization of fundamental concepts by Lösch. If Schwartz [a researcher
in marketing theory] provides a picture of the diversity and lack of
integration of the theoretical bases of marketing science, Christaller and
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Lösch presented a consistent frame for delineating training areas, selecting
retail locations, presenting marketing data, and evaluating markets.
Twenty years before Applebaum prepared his paper on marketing
geography, a theoretical frame had been developed within geography!”
(Berry, 1967, 126, emphasis original). 26
This critique of marketing geography was reaffirmed in the remaining pages of Berry’s
chapter by discussing efforts in marketing science towards understanding marketing
geography. In effect, this marginalization of marketing geography under the guise of
ineffectively situating itself within the discipline, marginalized the contributions that
Applebaum provided. 27 Moreover, the book was a spectacular success republished nine
times and translated into Japanese, Spanish, and French. It currently stands as Berry’s
second-highest ranked publication, with nearly 1,800 citations, 152 of which are from
2016 to the present. Moreover, in the decades following its publication, the book
continued to receive praise from academics, hailed in regional science as “one of 40 pathbreaking books” in the discipline (Waldorf, 2003).
In 1992, the book was revisited as part of Progress in Human Geography’s
“Classics in Geography Revisited” series. Here Berry noted that within geography the
reaction was mixed, with only one review from an Applebaum advisee, Bart Epstein.
Outside of the discipline and especially in trade journals, the book was well received. As
Berry stated about the contrasts between the disciplinary perspective and outsiders,

26 The use of italics is in the original is significant as the stylistics of the rest of the manuscript
conform to the use of italics in more traditional sense (titles of books, the defining of key topics,
the use of non-English words, mathematical formulas, etc) and not to convey the authors own
personal feelings.
27 It is also important to note Berry’s impact on the rest of the discipline: after leaving the
University of Chicago, Berry moved to Harvard where he would hold multiple roles—including
as the Director of Laboratory for Computer Graphics and Spatial Analysis in the Graduate School
of Design—from 1976 to 1981. Here these appointments point to a larger network and the
importance of site selection as a form of urban knowledge production.
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“Outside geography, social scientists were accustomed to theory and to the insights of
science. Within geography, adherents to earlier schools of thought were fighting a
defensive battle” (Davies et al., 1992, 222). This shifting of views reflects the
disciplinary void that Applebaum found himself in.
Given Berry’s contributions to various publications of the Super Market Institute
(which appeared side-by-side with Applebaum’s writing as well) and Berry’s work in
1965 in undertaking statistical analysis and modeling of Stop & Shop’s store locations,
their shared interest in applied geographical inquiry did exist. It was a matter of
epistemological differences as to the way in which to conduct this research. Moreover,
Berry stated that Applebaum was influential to his development of research activities
outside of the discipline, acting as a mentor to establish a consulting business and
assisting in the development of leads (Personal Correspondence with Berry, 7/6/20).
Thus, it is not as if Applebaum was completely ignored by the discipline, rather his
impact was felt outside of the pages of academic journals, the halls of American
geography departments, and intimate settings of academic conferences. It was a personal
impact, felt through mentorship and connection-making.
3.8

Applebaum’s Legacy: Applied Geography, Site Selection, and the Birth of
Radical Geography
After more than a decade of teaching at Harvard, Applebaum officially retired in

1968 and relocated to Florida where he continued consulting and publishing, selling his
techniques in the form of textbooks. Applebaum would die in 1978, contributing to his
fields of knowledge until a few years before his death (Harvard University, 2005).
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Applebaum’s legacy in the world and the discipline lives on in a number of key
ways. Perhaps most obviously, are the practices of site selection in the retail industry writ
large and the overall formation of a built environment that prioritizes size, scale,
efficiency, and profit over all else. Here, applied and business geographies continue to
assist business and government entities in spatially organizing and operating effectively.
While Applebaum’s work is reflective of the marketing patterns of the mid-twentieth
century, the intellectual framework and methods continue to guide a new generation of
academics and practitioners (Rice and Hernandez, 2016).
Moreover, while largely forgotten within in the discipline, the desires behind
these methods constitute a piece of the development of modern GIS and geotechnology
applications. While the use of computer maps beyond the 1960s SYMAP experiments in
his research was nonexistent, the integration of geography, marketing, and retailing is an
important use of GIS which continues to provide employment for non-academic
geographers. In fact, Applebaum was an early advocate for computing in business
research and worked with early versions of SYMAP at Harvard to automate and
computerize the site selection process (Applebaum, 1968). This map is likely among
some of the earliest digital site selection work conducted (Figure 3.8). 28

28 Another interesting footnote is the relationship between William Warntz (who took over
leadership for the Harvard Laboratory for Computer Graphics in 1968) and Applebaum in their
shared interest in food costs. Warntz’s dissertation at the University of Pennsylvania Department
of Geography and Industry (located in the Warton School of Business nonetheless) was entitled
Towards a Geography of Price and analyzed crop production and consumer demand (Warntz,
1959).
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Figure 3.8 Early SYMAP output of supermarkets in the Greater Boston Area
indicating average weekly value of groceries sold. (Applebaum, 1968)
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Perhaps ironically and paradoxically for someone whose main contributions to the
discipline were methodological, empirical, and in business relationship, Applebaum had
an impact on that formation of radical geography through his protegee Saul Cohen.
Cohen is well-regarded for reinvigorating the geography department at Clark University
during the 1960s, which in addition to maintaining non-quantitative human geography
also birthed the critical and radical revolutions within the discipline. Cohen, who spent
most of 1950s at Boston University, had assisted Applebaum with grant work and set up
his own independent site selection company (Waterman, 2002). In the early 1960s,
Cohen spent time in Washington, DC cultivating contacts among federal government
agencies, allowing him understand the needs and desires of major federal funders (Huber
et al., 2019). This education, in convincing funders to provide money and in
understanding what the federal government was willing to fund, proved to be important
to his future work.
When recruited by Clark University in 1965, the President of the university at the
time remarked to Cohen that “I’ll give you anything you want. There’s only one thing I
can’t give you—money.” To this Cohen replied, “I don’t need money” (Huber et al.,
2019) Utilizing his funding connections and skills Cohen secured a major grant from the
National Science Foundation, so large that it allowed the geography department to build a
new building on Clark’s campus and to hired a number of young geographers onto the
faculty. Several of these hires, including Dick Peet, would help birth radical and critical
geography in the United States. 29 Doubly ironic is the impact that these events would

29 Ironically, Dick Peet was known to claim that before the advent of Marxist geography, all
geographers looked at were supermarkets.
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have. Applebaum pioneered the techniques that functionally led to food deserts (here
defined as the lack of easy geographical access to grocery stores) in major cities and rural
areas, utilizing a matrix of maximum profitability. As Applebaum wrote in a 1964 trade
publication, “… most companies address their research to the question, ‘Will this location
be profitable?’, rather than to the more important question, ‘Where are the most
profitable sites for us?’” (Harvard Business School Archives). Under this rubric, poorer,
disenfranchised communities were more likely to have their grocery stores shuttered or
not have a new supermarket built, creating the beginnings of the food desert. By 1966,
food studies scholars had begun to document the lack of available food in urban areas
(Beaulac et al., 2009). By 1970, as smaller chains like A&P began to decline and the
large supermarkets well-known to consumers today emerged as the standard in new
supermarket construction, places like Cincinnati continued to see the number of
supermarkets decline. More than thirty years after Applebaum’s departure from
Cincinnati, in 1971 had a total 54 stores within the city limits, a decline in 193 grocery
stores from 1940 (Gwynn, n.d.). It is ironic then, that the direct impact of Applebaum’s
expertise would lead to the rise of critical geography, and sustained critical analysis and
movement to challenge Applebaum’s legacy within the food retailing industry.
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CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION
In writing this thesis, I have explored the social aspects of the discipline, weaving
together two separate but related stories that help illuminate the impact of the past on the
current state of the discipline. Through the construction of this historical geographical
narrative, I have sought to examine the changing nature of geography’s practical
applications to illuminate where we have been and where we might go. As these chapters
have shown, representation and abstraction via cartographic aids and site selection have
played an important role in bringing the discipline to bear outside of the academy.
The process writing history is both never neutral and always personal (Barnes,
2014). In the process of writing this thesis, I have also revealed a good deal about my
own personal interests and desires for the discipline. Conducting research into the history
of one’s own discipline is akin to looking at oneself in a funhouse hall of mirrors—your
vision of the discipline becomes distorted, with features shrinking and magnifying in
mystifying and comical ways. The path forward and backwards is hardly discernible,
forcing you to tread cautiously among the many dead-ends, searching for a path forward.
And every now and again you walk into a piece of evidence that makes you see stars.
Writing disciplinary history is also a humbling process. In addition to seeping
oneself into the debates of yesteryear, disciplinary history exposes you to the routine
milieu of the discipline. As Trevor Barnes has written, recanting his trips to the archive
and in conducting oral histories, one gathers more than just new perspectives on the past
of the discipline but also the social and personal intangibles that are all too infrequently
considered (Barnes, 2014). Unverifiable in a scientific sense, these findings speak
towards the idea of geography as a practice.
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For instance, rumor has it that Applebaum was denied admission to Graduate
School of Geography at Clark University due to being Jewish and was forced to return to
return to the University of Minnesota for his year of doctoral work. It is well documented
that the discipline was anti-Semitic, however I have yet to come across documentation
that directly impugns Applebaum due to his faith. These silences of the archive play out
in other ways as well. Richard Hartshorne donated his personal papers to the American
Geographical Society Library, where along with the papers of other eminent geographers,
they play a critical role in preserving the historic milieu of the discipline. Applebaum was
acquainted with Hartshorne from the mid-1920s likely until his death in the late 1970s.
For this fifty years of relationship, only a single letter of correspondence remains, in a
folder labeled “Miscellaneous Correspondence.”
Similarly, these silences beckon us to look further afield in a quest to better
contextualize the silence. For much of this writing process, I had conceived of the first
chapter as “groundbreaking” due to the lack of published information about Sanborn
maps in academic scholarship of any kind. While this type of hubristic thinking does not
make for great scholarship, it does reflect an observation about the state of academic
scholarship on Sanborn maps. These silences about the company and its products are
reflective of a disciplinary engagement with a different series and sort of questions than
the company catered to. For example, until the past few years, there were few
geographical perspectives on insurance. Moreover, while the term “map” was in the name
of the Sanborn Map Company, the company hired surveyors and not cartographers to
draw their maps. In addition to the large scale of the maps, it makes sense for Sanborn
maps to have more associated with surveying than mapping, reflecting a telling
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disciplinary split between surveying and cartography. The everyday practice of surveying
was left to the practical work of the engineer, cartography remained in the realm of art
and science, and geography turned its back on bot,h looking to discover different types of
knowledge. Given these divisions between surveying, cartography, and geography, we
can see how these degrees of separation have left the Sanborn Map Company
understudied.
Yet part of the history of Sanborn maps in the academy is not just how
geographers have utilized them, but also how they became aware that these maps existed.
Map libraries, librarians and catalogers, copyright laws, and cartographic training are all
important facets to understanding why there is a dearth of empirical research into the
operations and impact of the Sanborn Map Company. Without understanding the practice
of the discipline—and of other allied disciplines—it becomes difficult to envision how
and why various phenomena have manifested themselves in the discipline.
Another facet of this thesis speaks to the importance of representation and metalevel analysis. By understanding the development of a topic over a long period of time, it
becomes possible to understand how these ideas fit into larger concepts and historical
periods. I do not claim that my thesis is exceptional from others, rather I argue that the
view from “40,000 feet” provides a different understanding of the landscape than the
more nuanced details of other forms of analysis. Both examples speak well to this
concept. For example, each Sanborn map was an exercise in colonial power and the
importance of financial protection for a small section of a larger territory. Yet taken in
sum, the patterns of fire insurance mapping in Oklahoma reflects the dynamics of a
settler-colonial capitalism that sought to produce maximum profit as quickly as possible.
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Applebaum operated in a similar framework—on the ground, his site selection
policies influenced only small tracts of land. Yet on a mass scale, it assisted in reshaping
the American built environment, prioritizing new suburban retail over older forms of
urban retail. His work in training new generations of geographers and business students
and in consulting for corporations around the world allowed for these tactics to spread
further than one individual could realistically ever achieve. Without understanding
Applebaum’s long-term commitments, it is not possible to understand how he fits into the
discipline.
Here the role of representation and analysis provides an intellectual operational
framework to implement new modes of understanding in mass. These operational
currents provide not only an important way of understanding the world, but also in
crafting a narrative for other non-geographers to buy into; placing the onus of one’s work
on the pragmatic applications to a field of business as opposed to contributing to an
intellectual endeavor.
In writing a disciplinary history, you also see that generations of previous scholars
have struggled with similar issues, each rising to the challenge in their own unique way.
In this era of pandemic, frayed social conditions, and overall dim outlook not only for
higher education, but the larger nation, and to some extent the globe; where does
geography go from here? What are the values of geography? What is the value of
geography?
As I completed this thesis, with Black Lives Matter protests literally blocking the
street in front of my home, I finally decided to read Bill Bunge’s Fitzgerald (Bunge,
2011). Written during the unrest of the late 1960s, the book documents a nearly four127

hundred-year history of a single square mile of Detroit, with an emphasis on the
discriminatory nature of the “inner city.” While initially panned in reviews, over the past
several decades this work has emerged with an enduring legacy. The book, which in of
itself sought to be a piece of applied geographic descriptive work to educate the masses,
is well-regarded for its radical combination of historical, graphical, critical, and
descriptive analysis. Yet as Trevor Barnes and Nik Heynen have written:
“Fitzgerald is a tortured book, controversial, angry, partial, withering,
hyperbolic, with non sequiturs and unsubstantiated claims. It is at the
opposite polar end of traditional academic scholarship defined by
dispassion, measured judgment, comprehensive-ness, balance, precision,
transparent logic, and the painstaking documentation of sources.”
—(Bunge et al., 2011)
Fitzgerald, then, is not a piece of geographic scholarship that other geographers seek to
cite for its empirics, but rather for its methods, its presentation, and its impact. The
“Truth” of its claims is not the object of debate, but rather the way in which one views
and uses geography. The negative reviews of Fitzgerald failed to see what the work was
trying to do; it was a performative piece of scholarship that blew away the bounds of
what geographic scholarship was supposed to be. In this sense, this thesis was not an
applied or business approach to history of the discipline. It does not seek to provide
concrete actions to implement a new intellectual regime, rather to highlight some of the
inherent contradictions of the products of the discipline. The book highlights areas of the
discipline that operate in similar ways, showing how poorly received scholarship
provides future insights and revelations. Similar to the modern critiques levied against
Bunge—a crude understanding and manipulation of race and gender, and outright
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hostility to queerness—we can point out other forms of scholarship, that with the benefit
of hindsight, fall short of our modern expectations.
Yet in terms of a disciplinary perspective, we find the personalities of the
discipline are what make it operate. Producing scholars that are capable of a wide variety
of work is important: Bunge made rapid shifts from quantitative work to heavily
grounded social-theory work in the span of a few years (this also mirrors the development
of David Harvey who swung from historical geography to quantification to Marxism in
about fifteen years). Perhaps then, the lesson is a need to foster and craft a discipline
where geographers are open to embracing to a wide variety of approaches, interests, and
intellectual frameworks; asking individuals to command a large breadth of material and
skillsets that allow them to morph to fit the world around them. It also then seems critical
to explicitly impart this into our teaching, marketing, and overall view of the discipline.
Similar to the liberal arts school approach, which stresses the development of critical
thinking, geographers can combine our skillset and empirics to develop a wide-ranging
field of relevance to civil society, the academy, and the applied world. Thus, it is a
commitment to the disciple in all of its forms, regardless of how obscure, perverse, or
unjust. It is critical to build a discipline that advances a vision of the shared society where
geographers find themselves critical cogs in the system.
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